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INTRODUCTION 
Appellants, through counsel, respectfully submit the following Brief of the 
Appellants, pursuant to Rules 24, 26 and 27 of the UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE. 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken from a final order of the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Utah County, State of Utah, granting Defendant City of Pleasant Grove's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction over this 
matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0) i2^2 & Supp. 2005) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE #1: Did the trial court err in granting a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act's Immunity for a "natural 
condition," by finding that a "sudden gust of wind" was the cause of Daniel 
Grappendorf s injuries and death, even though the negligent storage of the artificial 
pitcher's mound in a vertical position against a chain-link fence, contrary to the 
manufacturer's instructions, preceded the gust and combined with the gust, and 
even though the wind would not have created a danger but for the negligent storage 
of the mound? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: When reviewing whether the trial court 
properly granted summary judgment, the appellate court accords no deference to 
the trial court's legal conclusions and reviews those conclusions for correctness. 
Furthermore, a trial court's interpretations and application of a statute is a question 
of law that is reviewed for correctness. Blackner v. State Dept. of Trans. 2002 UT 
44, U 8, 48 P.3d 949. 
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-2, et. 
seq.) (2002); UTAHR. CIV. P. 56(c) (2006); Blackner v. State Dept. of Trans. 2002 
UT 44, 48 P.3d 949; Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996). 
CITATION TO THE RECORD: This Issue was preserved in the 
trial court at R. 0495-0518, and Oral Argument at R. 1150 
ISSUE #2: Did the Governmental Immunity Act, as applied to the 
Grappendorfs, violate the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Constitutional issues are questions of law 
that are reviewed for correctness. Chen v. Stuart, 2004 UT 82 %25, 100 P.3d 1177; 
see also Tindley v. Salt Lake City School DisL, 2005 UT 30, f 11, 116 P.3d 295 
(whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness). The propriety of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Blackner v. State Dept. of Trans. 
2002UT44,p ,48P.3d949. 
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: UTAH CONST, art. I, § 11 
(1896) (a.k.a. Utah's Open Court's Clause); UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c) (2006); Berry 
ex rel Berry v. Beechcraft Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670 (Utah 1985); Laney v. 
Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, 57 P.3d 1007; Wood v. University of Utah Medical 
Center, 2002 UT 134, 67 P.3d 436; Tindley v. Salt Lake City School District, 2005 
UT 30, 116 P.3d 295; Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, (Utah 
1980). 
CITATION TO THE RECORD: This Issue was preserved in the 
trial court at R. 0881 -0892, and at Oral Argument 1150. 
ISSUE #3: Did the Governmental Immunity Act, as applied, violate 
the right to recover damages for injuries resulting in death of the Utah State 
Constitution? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Constitutional issues are questions of law 
that are reviewed for correctness. Chen v. Stuart, 2004 UT 82 f 25, 100 P.3d 1177; 
see also Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 2005 UT 30, 1 11, 116 P.3d 295 
(whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness). The propriety of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Blackner v. State Dept. of Trans. 
2002UT44,p ,48P.3d949. 
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: UTAH CONST, art. XVI, §5(1896); 
UTAHR. CIV. P. 56(c) (2006); Comp. Laws 1876, §§ 1216, 1217 (Utah 1876) and 
2 Comp. Laws 1888, §§ 2961, 2962, 3179 (Utah 1888) ("Lord Campbell's Act"); 
Mason v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 24 P. 796 (Utah 1890); Tucker v. Salt Lake City, 37 
P. 261 (Utah 1894); Thomas v. Springville City, 35 P. 503 (Utah 1894); Hopkins v 
Ogden City, 16 p. 596 (Utah 1888); Levy v. Salt Lake City, 16 P. 598 (Utah 1887); 
Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 44 P. 1050 (Utah 1896); Dwyer v. Salt Lake City, 57 P. 535 
(Utah 1899); Berry ex rel Berry v. Beechcraft Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670 (Utah 
1985); Tiede v. State of Utah, 915P.2d500, (Utah 1996); Parks v. Utah Transit 
Authority, 2002 UT 55, 53 P.3d 473; Tindley v. Salt Lake City School District, 
2005 UT 30, 116 P.3d 295; Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, 57 P.3d 1007; 
Standifordv. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, (Utah 1980). 
CITATION TO THE RECORD: This Issue was preserved in the 
trial court at R. 0881-0892, and at Oral Argument 1150. 
ISSUE #4: Did the Governmental Immunity Act, as applied, violate 
Grappendorf s Petition Rights under Utah State Constitution? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Constitutional issues are questions of law 
that are reviewed for correctness. Chen v. Stuart, 2004 UT 82 \ 25, 100 P.3d 1177; 
see also Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist, 2005 UT 30, f 11, 116 P.3d 295 
(whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law which is revieAved for 
correctness). The propriety of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Blackner v. State Dept. of Trans. 
2002 UT 44,18, 48 P.3d 949. 
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: UTAH CONST, art. I, § 1 (1896); 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c) (2006); Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625, (Utah 1977,); In re 
Anderson, 2004 UT 7,168, 82 P.3d 1134. 
CITATION TO THE RECORD: This Issue was preserved in the 
trial court at R. 0881 -0892, and at Oral Argument 1150. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
ADDENDUM 1: UTAH CONST, art. I, § 1 (1896); 
ADDENDUM 2: UTAH CONST, art. I, § 11(1896); 
ADDENDUM 3: UTAH CONST art. XVI, § 5 (1896, Rev. 1919); 
ADDENDUM 4: UTAH R. CIV. P. 56 (2006); 
ADDENDUM 5: UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-2(2002); 
ADDENDUM 6: UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-3(2002); 
ADDENDUM 7: UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(2002); 
ADDENDUM 8: "Lord Campbell's Act" Comp. Laws 1876, §§ 1216, 1217 
(Utah 1876); 2 Comp. Laws 1888, §§2961, 2962, 3179, (Utah 
1888); 
ADDENDUM 9: Memorandum Decision; 
ADDENDUM 10: Supplemental Memorandum Decision; 
ADDENDUM 11: Order. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: On June 21, 2002, thirteen-year-old 
Daniel Austen Grappendorf went to watch his sister play softball at the Discovery 
Park Baseball Diamonds, which are owned and operated by the Appellee, City of 
Pleasant Grove. ("Pleasant Grove"). Pleasant Grove also owned a 400+ pound, 
twelve foot by eight foot, portable pitching mound that was made of plywood and 
covered with artificial turf. 
Pleasant Grove improperly and negligently stored this pitching mound by 
standing it on its edge against a chain link fence, contrary to the manufacturer's 
express written instructions, which required the mound to be placed flat on the 
ground or flush against a wall, in order to prevent the wind from lifting the mound. 
As anticipated by the manufacturer, a gust of wind did pick up the pitching mound 
and caused it to sail like a Frisbee, striking, and crushing Daniel Grappendorf s 
skull, killing him instantly. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: On September 18, 2003, Daniel 
and Heidi Grappendorf, and Phil and Jenny Thompson, (collectively "the 
Grappendorfs") petitioned for redress of their grievances by commencing a 
wrongful death action in the Fourth District Court against Pleasant Grove and 
American Sports International, Ltd. a.k.a. American Athletics, Inc., an Iowa 
Corporation, Becwill Corp., dba Proper Pitch, a North Carolina Corp., Proper 
Pitch, and Does I-X. 
On February 28, 2005, the trial court heard oral argument on four pending 
motions: (1) Pleasant Grove's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on October 21, 
2004; (2) the Grappendorfs' Motion to Continue the Summary Judgment Motion 
pursuant to Rule 56(f), Utah R. Civ. P.; (3) the Grappendorfs' Motion to Amend 
their Opposition to Pleasant Grove's Summary Judgment Motion; and (4) Pleasant 
Grove's Motion to Strike the Grappendorfs' Motion to Amend their Opposition. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT: On March 29, 2005, the 
trial court issued its Memorandum Decision granting Pleasant Grove City's Motion 
for Summary Judgment on the grounds that the defendant city, as a governmental 
entity, was immune from suit pursuant to Utah's Governmental Immunity Act, 
concluding that the cause of Daniel Grappendorfs death was a "natural condition" 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(11)(2002), therefore, the case fell within 
that exception to the state's waiver of immunity. 
The trial court ruled that the second motion (Rule 56(f) motion) was moot 
because the court found that there were no issues of material fact which discovery 
could resolve. The third motion (motion to amend the original opposition) filed by 
the Grappendorfs argued that the Governmental Immunity Statute was 
unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution. The fourth motion (motion to strike) 
filed by Pleasant Grove addressed the constitutional issues raised in the motion to 
amend. The trial court granted the motion to amend, but did not allow full briefing 
of either the motion to amend or the motion to strike. The trial court treated the 
third motion, the motion to amend, and the fourth motion, the motion to strike, as 
supplemental oppositions and supplemental reply memorandum to Pleasant 
Grove's motion for summary judgment. Having treated both the third and fourth 
motions as motions to amend, the court felt no need to have full briefing. 
On April 6, 2005, Grappendorfs filed an objection to Pleasant Grove's 
proposed order on the March 29, 2005 memorandum decision. On May 19, 2005, 
the trial court issued a Supplemental Memorandum Decision. On December 22, 
2005, Defendant Becwill was dismissed with prejudice. On January 23, 2006 the 
only remaining defendant, American Athletics was dismissed with prejudice after 
the parties settled that claim. On January 30, 2006, Grappendorfs sought Rule 
54(b) certification of the summary judgment order in favor of Pleasant Grove. On 
April 19, 2006 the judgment was certified under Rule 54(b) UTAH R. CIV. P. 
(2006). This appeal ensued. 
FACTUAL STATEMENT 
1. Appellee-Pleasant Grove is a city in Utah, which owns and operates a 
recreational venue called "Discovery Park Baseball Diamonds" or "Manila Field." 
(Record on Appeal {hereinafter "R."), at 1053). 
2. To accommodate baseball and softball game play, Pleasant Grove 
purchased and used a 400-pound moveable pitching mound made of plywood and 
covered with artificial turf. (R. at 1053, 349-352, and 379). 
3. To store the pitching mound when it was not in use, a Pleasant Grove 
employee stood the pitching mound on its side and chained the mound to a chain-
link-fence, contrary to the manufacturer's express, written safety instructions, 
which required the pitching mound to be stored flat on the floor or "flush against a 
wall." (R. at 1053, 0445-0461, and 0388). 
4. The pitching mound was chained to the fence using a nylon strap that 
was intended by the manufacturer to be used only for the purpose of moving the 
pitching mound to and from the field, and not to secure the pitching mound to a 
fence. (R. at 0337-0343, 0388, 0513, and 0428-0429). 
5. The nylon strap was connected to the top edge of the pitching mound 
by four one-inch screws. (R. at 0337-0343). 
6. On June 21, 2002, thirteen-year-old Daniel Grappendorf went to 
watch his sister, Mallorie, play softball at Manila Field. (R. at 258, 512). 
7. At approximately 7:55 p.m., a summer wind gust lifted the mound up 
and pulled it away from the chain-link fence, causing it to sail like a 400-pound 
Frisbee. (R. at 1053, 0370, 0357, 0354, 0513, 0337-0343, 0511). 
8. The pitching mound struck and decapitated Daniel Grappendorf, 
killing him instantaneously. (R. at 1053, 0511, 0257) 
9. The trial court granted Pleasant Grove's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, finding that the gust of wind was the cause of Daniel Grappendorf s 
death, thereby finding the case to fall within the "natural condition" exception to 
the Governmental Immunity Act, and finding that the Act was constitutional 
despite Article I § 11 (Open Courts Clause) and Article XVI § 5 (Wrongful Death 
Guarantee) of the Utah Constitution. (R. at 1036-1053). 
10. On February 28, 2005, the trial court heard arguments regarding 
Article I § 1, (Petition Clause) of the Utah Constitution but did not address the 
issue in the memorandum decision. (R. at 1036-1053, Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 
13:8-11,29:20-25). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court misapplied and misinterpreted the "natural condition" 
exception to the Governmental Immunity Act as defined by Blackner v. State Dept. 
of Trans. 2002 UT 44, 48 P.3d 949. As applied by the trial court, the 
Governmental Immunity Act violates the Utah Constitution—Article I § 11 (the 
Open Courts Clause); Article XVI § 5 (the Wrongful Death Cause of Action 
Guarantee); and Article I § 1 (the Petition Clause). In addition, by expanding the 
definition of "government function" to include the operation of a baseball field, the 
trial court effectively abrogated any remedies against the government, in violation 
of Article I § 11 (the Open Courts Clause), Article XVI § 5 (the Wrongful Death 
Cause of Action Guarantee), and Article I § 1 (the Petition Clause). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE SHOULD BE NO IMMUNITY WHEN A NEGLIGENT 
GOVERNMENTAL ACT PRECEDES A NATURAL CONDITION 
AND CREATES A DANGER. 
Relying on Blackner v. Dept. of Transportation, 2002 UT 44, 48 P.3d 949, 
the trial court held that a gust of wind was the cause of Daniel Grappendorf s 
death, therefore, the "natural condition" exception to the waiver of immunity 
provided in the Governmental Immunity Act conferred immunity on the City of 
Pleasant Grove. In so doing, the trial court misinterpreted and/or misapplied 
Blackner. 
In pertinent part, the Governmental Immunity Act provides: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for 
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of his employment, except 
if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: 
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, 
UTAHCODEANN. 63-30-10(11X1997)1. 
1
 Effective July 1, 2004 the Governmental Immunity Act was reenacted as 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-101 et seq. holding injuries alleged to be caused by a 
governmental entity prior to July 1, 2004 to be governed by the Provisions of 63, 
Chapter 30. Thus Title 63, Chapter 30 is cited to in this memorandum. Therefore, 
In Blackner, this Court found that, "but for" a prior natural condition, a 
government employee would not have been negligent, therefore, the natural 
condition was the cause of the plaintiffs injuries. Id. at f 15. Thus, in Blackner the 
"natural condition" preceded the governmental negligence and was the cause of the 
plaintiffs injury. That is not the instant case. 
Specifically, in Blackner, a police officer stopped vehicular traffic that was 
en route up Little Cottonwood Canyon because an avalanche blocked the road 
ahead. The officer negligently stopped vehicles in a known slide area. Id. at ff 4-
5. While waiting for the avalanche to be cleared a second avalanche cascaded 
down the mountainside and injured Mr. Blackner. Id. at f 6. 
On those facts, this Court held that, "but for the snow pack and the first 
avalanche, Mr. Blackner would not have suffered injury." Id. at f 15. u[W]ere it 
not for the first avalanche, [the police officer] would not have stopped Blackner 
and others from proceeding up the canyon." Id. Thus, in Blackner, the natural 
condition (the snowpack and the first avalanche) created the danger. In Blackner, 
therefore, the natural condition—and not the government employee—was the 
cause of the plaintiffs injuries. 
as at the trial court, this Brief will look to the statute as it existed prior to July 1, 
2004. 
Unlike Blackner, in the instant case, the governmental negligence-
disregarding express written manufacturer's instructions and placing an artificial 
pitching mound in a position that was contrary to the safe procedure required by 
the manufacturer—created the danger. Here, in contradistinction to Blackner, the 
governmental negligence preceded the natural condition. Here, in contradistinction 
to Blackner, but for the negligent governmental act, the natural condition would 
not have caused the pitching mound to become airborne nor would the pitching 
mound have caused Daniel Grappendorf s death. 
Simple examples demonstrate the error in the trial court's application of 
Blackner to the instant case. Under the trial court's analysis, if the City of Pleasant 
Grove had suspended the pitching mound above the bleachers with kite string and 
the kite string broke, allowing a 400-pound object to fall on and crush dozens of 
fans, the city would be immune from suit—because gravity was a natural condition 
that caused the mound to fall. After all, but for gravity—a natural condition—the 
mound would not have fallen. 
Likewise, if a governmental entity renovated a state capitol building with 
walls and joists and roofs and floors that were substandard and below known 
engineering requirements published in applicable building codes, and the building 
collapsed in predictable wind conditions, killing scores of citizens—under the trial 
court's analysis in the instant case—the governmental entity would be immune 
from suit because hot air, and not substandard engineering, was a natural condition 
that caused the capitol to collapse. 
Such cannot have been the intended result of the legislature in providing a 
"natural condition" exception to the waiver of governmental immunity. Surely, in 
adopting a "natural condition" exception, the legislature was aware of the lesson of 
the Three Little Pigs: A gust of wind took down a house built of straw; a gust of 
wind took down a house built of sticks; but a gust of wind could not take down a 
house properly built from bricks. 
II. THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT, AS APPLIED, 
VIOLATES THE OPEN COURTS CLAUSE. 
The Utah State Constitution provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to 
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 11. This provision, known as the "Open Courts Clause,55 
guarantees parties an access to a judicial forum in which their petitions for redress 
may be heard. The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a two-pronged test to 
determine whether legislation runs afoul of the Open Courts Clause. See Berry ex 
rel Berry v. Beechcraft Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985). 
Under the Berry test, a law that abrogates a common law remedy or cause of 
action is constitutional only if it meets one of two requirements: 1) the law 
abrogating the remedy also provides an injured person an effective and reasonable 
alternative remedy; or 2) there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated, 
and the elimination of the existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable 
means for achieving the objective. Id; see also Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 
79, ff 49-55; 57 P.3d 1007, 1021-1023 (finding the Governmental Immunity Act 
violated the Open Courts Clause when the Appellant right to sue the government 
for a proprietary function was abrogated) 
Grappendorfs argued below that the application of the Governmental 
Immunity Act abrogated their claims against the governmental defendants.2 In 
general, Utah courts have recognized negligence actions against governmental 
entities since prior to statehood. See Levy v. Salt Lake City, 1 P. 160, 162 (Utah 
1881). The trial court abrogated the Grappendorfs claims in two respects. 
First, exDandins the definition of natural conditions to include the 
circumstances of the instant case has, in essence, abrogated any cause of action that 
results in physical injury against a governmental entity. See Blackner v. State 
2
 More specifically, the 1987 amendments to the Governmental Immunity 
Act, which included the laundry list of exceptions to the original 1965 Act's 
waiver, abrogated Appellants' claims. See generally UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-1 et 
seq. (1953 as amended 1966); cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10 et seq. (1986 & 
Supp. 1989). 
Dept of Tramp., 2002 UT 44, 48 P.3d 949. Injury does not occur in the absence 
of some natural condition, such as gravity, friction, or wind, etc. Second, Utah 
recognized a cause of action arising from the negligent operation of a golf course 
mStandifordv. Salt Lake City, 605 P.2d 1230, 1237 (Utah, 1980)—essentially the 
same cause of action as the Grappendorfs asserted below. 
Moreover, the Governmental Immunity Act provides no alternative remedy 
for the Grappendorfs in this case. Under the trial court's application of the 
Governmental Immunity Act, the Grappendorfs' claims are simply foreclosed, and 
they are suffered to bear the costs of Pleasant Grove's negligence. And the act 
itself states no "clear social or economic evil" to be eliminated by closing the doors 
of the courts on injured parties, such as the Grappendorfs. 
The trial court interprets Blackner in a manner that contravenes the Open 
Courts clause. The trial court found "but for the sudden gust of wind, the injury 
would not have arose"~whereas the correct interpretation would be that, but for the 
obviously negligent placement of the pitching mound by Pleasant Grove 
employees, contrary to the specific directions given to Pleasant Grove employees, 
the gust of wind would have caused no injury. Clearly, the trial court's misuse of 
the Blackner "but for" test abrogates any negligence claims and the Grappendorfs' 
rights under the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution under the test created 
in Berry is violated. 
Second, the operation of a baseball park, like a golf course in Standiford, is 
proprietary and as such is not entitled to immunity and therefore, applying the 
Governmental Immunity Act is unconstitutional. In Laney, this Court determined 
that it was an abrogation of rights, which provided no alternative remedy nor 
eliminated any clear or social economic evil; therefore, pursuant to the Berry test, 
it was unconstitutional to expand the definition of "government function" to 
include proprietary functions such as a recreational facility. 2002 UT 79, ff 53-55. 
In Laney the concurring opinion of Justices Howe and Russon recognizes 
that "[i]f government chooses to engage in proprietary activities, it must do so on 
the same basis as private persons. It has been long established that government, 
when performing proprietary functions, is liable for its actions." Id. at | 77. 
In Laney, the Supreme Court found U.C.A. 63-30-2(4)(a), the same section 
interpreted by the trial court to grant immunity to Pleasant Grove, to be 
unconstitutional as applied: 
"Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, operation, 
function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not 
the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is 
characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental 
function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, 
essential to or not essential to a government or governmental 
function, or could be performed by private enterprise of private 
persons, {emphasis added). 
UTAH CODE ANN. 63-30-2(4)(a). 
In Standiford, this Court held that the negligent operation of a golf course is 
not protected by the Governmental Immunity Act, because it is a proprietary 
activity. Id. at 1236-1237. Thus, any interpretation of the Governmental 
Immunity Act that abrogates a cause of action for proprietary functions of a 
governmental agency, would be considered unconstitutional under the open courts 
clause test of Berry. Because the operation of a ballpark is proprietary, under 
Berry} an amendment to the Act that abrogates the Grappendorfs' cause of action is 
an unconstitutional violation of the Open Courts clause. 
III. AS APPLIED, THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY IMPAIRS THE WRONGFUL DEATH 
CAUSE OF ACTION GUARANTEE. 
The Governmental Immunity Act, as applied to the Grappendorfs' claims for 
the wrongful death of their child, violated their constitutional right to assert a 
wrongful death claim. 
The Utah State Constitution provides: 
The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, 
shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be 
subject to any statutory limitation, except in cases where 
compensation for injuries resulting in death is provided for by law. 
UTAH STATE CONST., art. XVI, § 5 (1896). 
This Court has held that, where the Constitution clearly prohibits the 
Legislature form abrogating a "right to action," it is necessary to determine what 
the right was and who enjoyed it—at the time the Constitution was adopted. Tiede 
v. State of Utah, 915 P.2d 500, 503 (Utah 1986). 
The Court erred in Tiede in concluding that the government was immune 
from suit for wrongful death at the time the Utah Constitution was adopted. In 
fact, actions for wrongful death were recognized prior to the adoption of the Utah 
Constitution. Accordingly, the legislature did, in fact, abrogate an existing right of 
action when it enacted the Governmental Immunity Act, in violation of Article 
XVI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 504. 
The Supreme Court of Utah will overturn precedent if convinced it is clear 
that the rule was originally erroneous. Laney, 2002 UT 79, 45. It should do so in 
the instant case. 
This Court may not have been provided with accurate historical information 
when Tiede was decided and the Court held that no cause of action existed for 
wrongful death against the state or its subdivisions when Utah adopted its 
constitution, 915 P,2d at 504, Instead, the Court relied on a procedural statute that 
was enacted in 1896 in concluding that a claim for wrongful death did not exist at 
the time of the adoption of the constitution. (See 1898 Revised Statutes of Utah § 
929) . Id. According to Tiede, the Act on which this Court based its determination 
This Act gave the Power to "[t]he governor, the secretary of state, and the 
attorney general constitute a board of examiners, with power to examine all claims 
against the State." 
that there was no cause of action for wrongful death was enacted a year after the 
constitution was adopted. Id. 
In fact, as early as 1874 and through 1898, Utah had in effect a wrongful 
death statute, known as "An Act providing damages for death caused by wrongful 
act, negligent or default."4 That statute provided: 
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, 
neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as 
would, if the death had not ensued, have entitled the party 
injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect 
thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who, or the 
company or corporation which would have been liable if death 
had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, 
notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the 
death shall have been caused under such circumstances as 
amount to law to felony, {emphasis added). 
Comp. Laws Territory of Utah 1874; 2 Comp.1888 § 2961; See Mason v. Union 
Pac. Ry. Co. 24 P. 796 (Utah 1890) (finding that Utah's wrongful death statute 
created a new cause of action in the heirs to pursue a claim of negligence on behalf 
of the deceased if the negligence caused his death). Unlike the procedural statute, 
1898 Revised Statutes of Utah § 929, this statute was in effect at the time of the 
adoption of the Utah Constitution. 
Historically, common law gave a person injured without fault a right to 
recover from the person or corporation whose negligence or wrongful act produced 
4
 Also known as "Lord Campbell Act." 
injury, and, if death ensued from such negligence or wrongful act, the statute gives 
his heirs a right of action to recover compensation from the same person or 
corporation for the injury in consequence of his death. Id. at 797. If a cause of 
action existed for negligent acts against a governmental entity such as a municipal 
corporation at the adoption of the Utah Constitution, then, with this statute, a cause 
of action existed at the time the constitution was adopted against the municipal 
corporation for wrongful death. 
Accordingly, any statute that abrogates this right, as does the governmental 
immunity act in this instance, is unconstitutional pursuant to Article XVI § 5 of the 
Utah Constitution. With the enactment of "Lord Campbell's Act, the question 
turns from was there a cause of action against a governmental entity for wrongful 
death, to was there a cause of action for negligence against the governmental entity 
at the time of the enactment of the constitution. This question is unequivocally and 
resoundingly YES. 
Negligence was a cause of action against governmental entities when Utah 
adopted its constitution. See Thomas v. Springville City, 35 P. 503 (Utah 1894) 
(city liable for negligent maintenance of a bridge where plaintiff was injured); 
Hopkins v. Ogden City, 16 P. 596 (Utah 1888) (city was negligent when horse fell 
through a break in a water pipe); Yearance v. Salt Lake City, 24 P. 254 (Utah 
1890); (city negligently placed bricks across a walkway, which injured plaintiff); 
Levy v. Salt Lake City, 16 P. 598, 604 (Utah 1887) (city is liable for injuries caused 
through its neglect to keep in proper repair a ditch constructed over private 
property); Tucker v. Salt Lake City, 37 P. 261 (Utah 1894) (city was negligent 
when it built a steep grade sidewalk that caused plaintiff to fall and break her arm). 
Further, even after the enactment of the procedural statute, 1898 Revised 
Statutes of Utah § 929, courts continued to hear cases against Utah's cities for 
negligence. See, Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 44 P. 1050 (Utah 1896) (city was 
negligent when Plaintiff fell into a hatchway behind city hall); Dwyer v. Salt Lake 
City, 57 P. 535 (Utah 1899) (city was negligent for not maintaining street). 
Because negligence was a cause of action against a governmental entity 
when the Utah Constitution was adopted; and because the wrongful death statute 
was enacted prior to the adoption of the Constitution; and because the wrongful 
death statute applied to every case of negligence; a cause of action for wrongful 
death existed at the time the Utah Constitution was adopted. The Governmental 
Immunity Act abrogated that existing cause of action for wrongful death; therefore 
the Governmental Immunity Act is unconstitutional as applied in this case. 
IV. AS APPLIED, THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
VIOLATES THE PETITION CLAUSE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
The Utah State Constitution provides that "[a]ll men have the inherent and 
inalienable right to . . . petition for redress of grievances . . . ." UTAH CONST, art. I, 
§ 1 (1896). A "petition" is merely "[a] formal written request presented to a court 
or other official body . . . . In some states, a lawsuit's first pleading." Black's Law 
Dictionary 1182 (8th Ed. 2004). InKish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah 1977), the 
Utah Supreme Court recognized that "the Constitution of Utah . . . gives its citizens 
the 'inherent and inalienable' right to petition a state tribunal for redress of 
grievances in civil actions." Id. at 627; see also In re Anderson, 2004 UT 7, % 68, 
82 P.3d 1134 ("In filing a civil action . . . Judge Anderson exercised his right to 
petition for redress of grievances."). Clearly, civil actions such as Grappendorfs' 
are petitions for the redress of grievances, and are therefore constitutionally 
protected. 
In this case, the Fourth District Court did not address Grappendorfs' Petition 
Clause Claims. Instead, it simply held that the Governmental Immunity Act barred 
Plaintiffs5 claims. In effect, however, the court's decision implicitly held that the 
Governmental Immunity Act could alienate Grappendorfs' right to petition for the 
redress of their grievances. On its face, such a conclusion unconstitutionally 
abrogates the Appellants' right to petition for the redress of their grievances. The 
Appellate Court should address this issue by first interpreting and giving effect to 
the Petition Clause from the Utah State Constitution, and then weighing that 
provision against the legislation at issue—both matters of first impression. 
CONCLUSION 
Initially, and dispositively as to this appeal, the trial court erred when it 
interpreted and the "natural condition" exception so as to improperly draw the case 
within the Governmental Immunity Act. The Grappendorfs' Open Court rights 
have been abrogated in two ways, first by unreasonably broad interpretation of the 
"natural condition" exception, and second, by defining "government function" so 
broadly as to make the proprietary function of maintaining a baseball field immune 
from suit, contrary to Laney v. Fairview, which. 
The Court should revisit and reverse Teide v. State of Utah, and find that a 
governmental entity was liable for negligence and that a wrongful death action 
existed at the time the Utah Constitution was adopted, therefore, the Governmental 
Immunity Act abrogated an existing right of the Grappendorfs. The Supreme 
Court of Utah must find the statute is unconstitutional when applied to wrongful 
death cases. 
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of September 2006. 
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1 [Inherent and inalienable rights ] 
2 [All political power inherent in the people ] 
3 [Utah inseparable from the Union ] 
4 [Religious liberty — No property quahfica 
tion to vote or hold office ] 
5 [Habeas corpus ] 
6 [Right oo bear arms ] 
7 [Due process of law ] 
8 [Offenses bailable ] 
9 [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punish-
ments ] 
10 [Trial by jurv j 
11 [Courts open — Redress of injuries ] 
12 [Rights of accused persons ] 
13 [Prosecution b \ information or indictment 
— Grand jury ] 
14 [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issu-
ance of warrant ] 
Section 
15 [Freedom of speech and of the press — Li-
bel ] 
16 [No imprisonment for debt — Exception ] 
17 [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting] 
18 [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impair 
mg contracts ] 
19 [Treason defined — Proof] 
20 [Military subordinate to the civil power ] 
21 [Slavery forbidden ] 
22 [Private propertv for public use ] 
23 [Irrevocable franchises forbidden ] 
24 [Uniform operation of laws ] 
25 [Rights retained bv people ] 
26 [Provisions mandators ana prohibitory ] 
27 [Fundamental rights ] 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their 
lives and liberties to acquire, possess and protect property to worship accord-
ing to the dictates of their consciences to assemble peaceably protest against 
wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right 
History Const. 1896 




Consequences of obscenity conviction 
Family law 
License fees 
Liauor prombition and control 
Motorcvcle Helmet law 
Picketing 
Polygamy 
Property nghts generally 
Residence reauirement for city officers and em-
olovees 
Succession to property 
Unfair Practices Act 
Advertising prohibition 
A. city ordinance that prohibits price adver 
tismg of eyeglasses is an invalid limitation on 
rights guaranteed m this section since such a 
limitation is not necessary for the health 
morals welfare or some similarly important 
consideration of the public weal Rithoizv City 
of Salt Lake 3 Utah 2d 385 284 P 2d 702 
(1955) 
Cigarette law 
The cigarette law does not infringe this sec 
tion State v Packer Corp 77 Utah 500 297 P 
1013 (1931) 
Consequences of obsceni tv convict ion 
City ordinance providing for the suspension 
of an adult theater license upon conviction of 
the licensee for violation of the citv s obscenity 
ordinances was a proper prior restraint on the 
right to free speech West Gallery Corp v Salt 
Lake City Bd of Comm rs 586 P 2d 429 (Utah 
1978) 
Enjoining future operations of a bookstore 
after revocation of its license upon conviction 
of licensee for violation of city obscenity ordi-
nances was not an unconstitutional prior re-
57 
Tab 2 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS Art I, § 11 
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L Rev 
319 
Recent Developments m Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Criminal Law 1988 Utah L 
Rev 177 
Am Jur 2d — 47 Am Jur 2a Jury § 7 et 
seq 
C.J.S — 50 C J S Juries § 9 et seq 
A.L.R. — Driving while intoxicated or sum 
lar offense right to trial by jury m criminal 
prosecution for 16 A L R 3d 1373 
Right in equitv suit to jurv trial of counter 
claim involving legal issue 17 x4> L R 3d 1321 
Issues in garnishment as triable to court or 
to jury 19 A L R 3d 1393 
Automobiles validity and construction of 
legislation authorizing revocation or suspen-
4.NALYSIS 
Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871 
Actions by court 
Actions bv state 





—Suspension of execution of death sentence 
Debt collection 
District court jurisdiction 
Election contest 
Forum non conveniens 
Injurv or damage to propertv 
Intoxicating liquor 
Land Registration A.ct 
Limitations 
—Limitations of actions 
—Statutory limitation of review 
Occupational disease law 
Sovereign immunity 
Torts 
—A.ction bv wife against husband 
—Loss of consortium 
Unlicensed law practice 
Waiver of rights 
Wonanens compensation law 
Cited 
sion of operator's license for "habi tual" "per-
sistent," or "frequent" violations of traffic reg-
ulations 48 A L R 4th 367 
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial 48 A.LR4th 747 
Paternity proceedings right to jury trial 51 
A L R 4 t h 565 
Right to jury trial in action for retaliatory 
discharge from employment 52 A L R 4th 
1141 
Right to jurv trial m state court divorce pro-
ceedings 56 A L R 4th 955 
Jury trial rights m and on appeal from 
small claims court proceeding, 70 A L R 4th 
1119 
Key Numbers — Jury ®= 9 et seq 
Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
Jurisdiction over actions brought under the 
Civil Rignts \ c t of 1871 42 U S C 1981 et 
seq is vested ongmallv m the federal courts 
but the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by 
state courts is not thereby prohibited in view 
of the provisions of this section therefore it 
was error for trial court to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction otherwise proper action Drought 
under 42 U S C 1983 Kish v Wngnt 562 V2a 
625 (Utah 1977) 
Trial court would not err in dismissing ac 
tion brought under ^2 U S C 1983 on the 
ground of forum non convemens in a proper 
case but such dismissal should be without 
prejudice so that the plaintiff might move his 
suit to another forum without harm to his 
claim Kish v Wright 562 P 2d 625 (Utan 
1977) 
Actions by court. 
Court of equity has jurisdiction to open pro-
bate proceeding and to proceed against bond of 
administratrix where she has practiced extrin-
sic fraud on the court Weyant v Utah Sav & 
Trust Co 54 Utah 181 182 P 189 9 \ L R 
1119 (1919) 
Actions by state. 
This section did not alter the law with re-
spect to certain rights which are vested m the 
Sec, 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him m his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay, and no person 
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal m this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party 
History: Const 1896. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
83 
Tab 3 
LABOR Art XVI, § 5 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 48 Am Jur 2d Labor and C.J.S. — 51 C J S Labor Relations § 8 
Labor Relations §§ 21 to 28 Key Numbers. — Labor Relations «= 24 
Sec. 5. [Injuries resulting in death — Damages,] 
The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting m death, shall 
never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any 
statutory limitation, except m cases where compensation for injuries resulting 
m death is provided for by law 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: Const. 1896; L. 1919 (S.S.), S.C.R. 
1. 
ANALYSIS 
Claim of dependents 
Conflict of laws 
Product Liability Act 
PurDose of amendment 
Railroad pass 
Workers compensation 
Claim of dependents. 
Under this section, it is beyond the power of 
the legislature to take from dependents of an 
employee their claim against tne employer 
where such employee dies as the result of a 
wrongful injury by the employer Hailing v 
Industrial Comma 71 Utah 112 263 P 78 
(1927) 
Conflict of laws. 
In action brought m Colorado by father to 
recover for alleged wrongful death of son while 
passenger on defendant s bus, as result of acci-
dent which occurred m Utah, father s nght to 
recover and amount of recovery was governed 
by constitutional and statutory provisions of 
Utah Stolz v Burlington TransD Co 178 F 2d 
514, 15 A L R 2 d 759 QOth Cir 1949) 
In wrongful death action by Utan resident 
against Colorado residents in which Utah 
court had quasi m rem jurisdiction Utah court 
applied Utah law on matter concerning any 
limitation placed on the amount of damages 
recoverable Rhoades v Wngnt, 622 P 2d 343 
(Utah 1980), cert denied, 454 U S 897 102 S 
Ct 397 70 L Ed 2d 212 (1981) 
Product Liability Act. 
Section 78-15-3 a limitations provision m 
the Utah Product Liability Act which prior to 
1989, barred actions without regard to when 
an injury occurs and was not designed to pro-
vide a reasonable time withm which to file a 
lawsuit was unconstitutional because it vio-
lated this section and the open courts clause of 
the Utah Constitution Berry ex rel Berry v 
Beech Aircraft Corp, 717 P 2d 670 (Utah 
1985; 
Purpose of amendment. 
The 1920 amendment to this section which 
added the exception was not designed or in-
tended to preserve all rights formerly guaran-
teed and also to create new rights on contrary 
its very purpose was to abrogate some rignts 
formerly heid by persons entitled to sue under 
wrongful death statute Henrie v Rocky Mt 
Packing Corn , 113 Utan 415, 196 P 2d 487 
(1948), rehearing denied, 113 Utah 444 202 
P 2 d 727 (1949) 
Railroad pass. 
Provision m free pass issued to employee ab-
solving railroad from liability was valid and 
effective as to interstate commerce in view of 
federal decisions which prevail over conflicting 
state law heirs of employee wno was killed 
while riding as interstate passenger on such 
pass were precluded thereby as matter of law 
from recovering under this section as against 
railroad company for ordinary negligence as 
distinguished from wanton or gross negligence 
notwithstanding this constitutional provision, 
since decedent could not have recovered there-
for had he lived Francis v Southern Pac Co 
333 U S 445 68 S Ct 611 92 L Ed 798 
11948) 
Workers' compensation. 
Prior to the amendment of this provision, m 
all cases of death by wrongful act or neglect 
widow could not waive rights of minor children 
to action for damages and accept workers com-
pensation Garfield Smelting Co v Industrial 
Comm'n 53 Utah 133 178 P 57 {1918) 
Minor heirs of deceased workman, including 
unborn child would be bound by industrial 
commission s award upon application of widow, 
thus award was not overturned on contention 
that employer might be exposed to double ha-
259 
Tab 4 
187 JTAJi RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Kuie oo 
_. Grounds 
^ _ Excusable neglect 
" A default certificate mav be set aside upon 
nrnunds 01 excusable neglect Heathman v Fa 
£ * & Clendemn 14 Utah 2d 60 3 " - P2d 189 
(1962) 
While reliance on an at torneys assurances 
that one s rights are being protected could m 
the appropriate circumstances be seen as ex 
cusabie neglect trial court properl} refused to 
excuse the neglect of a defendant who failed to 
establish that she was so represented Miller v 
Brocksmith 825 P2d 690 (Utah Ct App 1992) 
—Judicial attitude 
Where any reasonable excuse is offered b\ 
defaulting party courts generally tend to favor 
granting relief from a default judgment unless 
to do so would result m substantial prejudice or 
injustice to the adverse parrv Westmghouse 
"Elec SuDplv Co v Paul W Larsen Contractor 
544 P 2d 876 (Utah 1975) 
—Movant's duty 
Party wno seeks to have a default judgment 
set aside must proffer some defense of at least 
sufficient ostensible merit to justify a trial on 
4hat issue Downey State Bank v Major 
^Blakene} Com 545 P2d 507 (Utah 1976) 
h—Setting aside proper 
T*~ Where plaintiff se^-ved defendant with a sum 
- mons and left a cony with the deiendant whicn 
jwas not the same as the original uhe court had 
^unsenction but sufficient confusion was ere 
jtted so that a motion to set aside the default 
judgment snould have been granted and the 
defenaant allowed to plead consistenc with our 
declared pohev that m case of uncertainty 
default judgments should be set aside to allow 
trial on the merits Locke v Peterson 3 Utah 2d 
^15 285 P2d 1111 (1955 
Default judgment and writ of garnishment 
were Droperly set aside where trial court iailed 
to ootain jurisdiction over defendant because 
summons was not timely issued Fibreboard 
Paper Prods Corp v Dietrich 25 Utah 2d 65 
475 P2d 1005 (1970) 
Where appellants plaintiffs in a civil action 
promptly objected to date set for trial on the 
ground that their counsel had an already 
scheduled appearance in another court on that 
date but due to fact that there were no law or 
motion davs between time oojection was filed 
and trial aate objection wa« never heard re 
fusal to set aside default judgment entered 
when appellants failed to appear on oial date 
was an abuse of discretion Griffiths v 
Hammon 560 P2d 1375 (Utah 19r"p* 
Tune for appeal 
Unaer former Rule 73(h the time for appeal 
from a aeiault judgment in a citv court ran from 
the aate of notice of entrv oi such juagment 
ratner J ian from the date of judgment Buck 
ner v Mam Realtv & Ins Co 4 Utan 2a 124 
288 P2d nS6 1955 but see Central Bank & 
Trust Co v Jensen aupra and Rule 58A(d) 
Cited in Utan Sand & Gravel Prods Corp v 
Tolbert 16 Utah 2d 40" 402 P2a ^03 ±965) 
J P W Enters Inc v Naef 604 P2d 486 Utah 
1979) Katz v Pierce "32 P2d 92 Utah 1986) 
Lund v Brown 2000 UT 75 l l P3d 27" 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review — Reason 
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for In 
;sonam Deiault Judgment in Utah Granam 
gawa\a 1981 B YU L Rev 93" 
Jur 2a — 46 4m Jur 2d Judgments § 
> et seq 
B.J S — 49 C J S Judgments ^§ 18" to 218 
..R — Necessity oi taking proof as to 
lirv against aeiaultmg defenaant 8 
LR3d 1070 
peaiabihtv of order setting aside or refus 
to set asiae default judgment 8 \ L R 3d 
sfaulting deiendant s i-ight to notice and 
hearing as to determination oi amount oi dam 
ages 15 A L R 3 d 586 
Openmg default or default judgment claimed 
to have been obtained because of attorneys 
mistake as to time or place oi appearance trial 
or filing of necessarv papers 21 \ L R 3d 1255 
Failure to give notice of application for de 
fault judgment where notice is required onlv D\ 
custom 28 \ L R 3d 1383 
Failure or party or his attornev to appear at 
pretrial conierence So ^ L R 3d 303 
Deiault judgments against fhe Unitea States 
under Rule 55ie of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 55 \ L R Fed 190 
le 56, Summary judgment . 
EJa) For claimant \ partv seeking to recover upon a claim counterclaim or 
Bs-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment mav at anv time after the 
pration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
potion for bummarv judgment bv the adverse partv move for summary 
gaient upon all or any part thereof 
g) For defending party A party against whom a claim counterclaim or 
s-ciarm is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sougnt may at any time 
l* o r s unimary judgment as to all or any part thereof 
lotion and proceedings thereon The motion memoranda and affidavits 
3e in accordance with Rule 7 The judgment sought shall be rendered if 
eadings depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, 
Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 188 
together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to 
the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controvers}7, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits: further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed b}? depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against a party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to 
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant 
to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the 
court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party 
the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, 
including reasonable attornej^s fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt, 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997: November 1, 2004.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 2004 amend- satisfaction of the court at any time that" at the 
ment substituted "move for summary judg- beginning of the first sentence in Subdivision 
mentr for "move with or without supporting (g); and made stylistic changes throughout. 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor" Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
in Subdivisions (a) and (b); in Subdivision (c). Rule 5^ F.R.C.P. 
deleted "filed and served" before "in accordance Cross-References. - Contempt generally, 
with' and substituted \Rule 7 for "CJA 4-501 ; tc 78-7-18 78-32-1 et sea 
substituted "If for "Should it appear to the 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Affidavit. —Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Contents. —Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
—Corporation. Resting on pleadings. 
—Experts. —Objection. 
— Extension of time to submit. —Sufficiency. 
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UT ST § 63-30-2 
U.C.A. 1953 § 63-30-2 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL-
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
63-30-2 Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages 
against a governmental entity or against an employee. 
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, 
employees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing 
body, members of a board, members of a commission, or members of an 
advisory body, officers and employees in accordance with Section 67-5b-
104, student teachers holding a letter of authorization in accordance 
with Sections 53A-6-103 and 53A-6-104, educational aides, students 
engaged in providing services to members of the public in the course of 
an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care 
clinical training program, volunteers, and tutors, but does not include 
an independent contractor. 
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection 
(2) (a), whether or not the individual holding that position receives 
compensation. 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions 
as defined in this chapter. 
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, 
operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or 
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is 
characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental 
function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, 
essential to or not essential to a government or governmental function, 
or could be performed by private enterprise or private persons. 
agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental enniry. 
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of 
property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or 
estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his 
agent. 
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property 
damage. 
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school district, 
public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement or 
taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporation. 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, 
estate, or interest in real or personal property. 
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, department, 
agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, 
university, or other instrumentality of the state. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 2; 1973, ch. 103, § 2; 1978, ch. 27, § 1; 1981, 
ch. 116, § 1; 1983, ch. 129, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 2; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 4, 
§ 1; 1988, ch. 2, § 338; 1991, ch. 248, § 6; 1994, ch. 192, § 1? 1994, ch. 260, 
§ 79? 1999, ch. 108, § 32; 2000, ch. 224, § 12. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. —The 1994 amendment by ch. 192, effective May 2, 1994, 
substituted "Section 67-5b-104" for "Section 62A-4-603" in Subsection (2)(a) 
and made a punctuation change. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 260, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "Section 
62A-4a-503" for "Section 62A-4-603" in Subsection (2)(a). 
The 1999 amendment, effective July 1, 1999, substituted "Section 53A-6-104" for 
"Section 53A-6-101" in Subsection (2)(a). 
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, in Subsection (2) (a) substituted 
"holding a letter of authorization" for "certificated" and "Sections 53A-6-103 
and" for "Section." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 







The 1987 amendment of Subsection (4)(a), eliminating the distinction between 
governmental and proprietary functions to determine the scope of immunity, is 
unconstitutional as it applies to municipalities operating electrical power 
systems; the provision violates the open courts clause of Utah Const., Art. I, 
§ 11. Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, 57 P.3d 1007. 
Plaintiffs could maintain action against city for alleged negligence in the 
maintenance of power lines, even though maintenance decisions fell within the 
discretionary function exception of § 63-30-10, because Subsection (4)(a) of 
this section is unconstitutional to the extent it makes the operation of 
electrical power systems by municipalities a governmental function. Laney v. 
Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, 57 P.3d 1007. 
Construction and application. 
Fulfilling the requirements of this chapter does not excuse a plaintiff from 
also complying with the procedural requirements of the Malpractice Act (Title 
78, Chapter 14) if both apply, and failure to comply with all the procedural 
requirements of each act, when both are implicated, may be fatal to the cause 
of action. Carter v. Milford Valley Mem'l Hosp., 2000 UT App 21, 996 P.2d 1076. 
Governmental entity. 
Complaint of inmate of state prison for damages from injuries inflicted by 
fellow prisoner was properly dismissed as to state because state is 
governmental entity and because statute waiving sovereign immunity from 
negligent acts of governmental entities specifically excepts injuries arising 
out of incarceration of any person in any state prison from the operation of 
the statute; although warden of the state prison is not "governmental entity" 
within statute and consequently was not immune from suit for alleged 
negligence, complaint against him was properly dismissed under common-law rule 
that where one inmate has injured another, warden and other prison officers are 
protected by doctrine of sovereign immunity against claims of negligence so 
long as they are acting in good faith. Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 
P.2d 367 (1968) . 
A judge is an officer of a state governmental entity and is therefore an 
employee for purposes of the notice of claim requirements of § 63-30-11. Spoons 
v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82, 987 P.2d 36. 
Governmental function. 
Operation of sewage facilities by sanitary district was governmental function 
and, prior to Governmental Immunity Act, district enjoyed immunity from suit 
for damages. Johnson v. Salt Lake County Cottonwood San. Dist., 20 Utah 2d 389, 
438 P.2d 706 (1968) . 
County's failure to indemnify state prison psychiatrist for costs incurred in 
defending an action that arose from acts or omissions within the scope of her 
employment was plainly a governmental function. The county was thus immune from 
suit for any alleged injuries caused by the exercise of that function unless 
that immunity was expressly waived. Atiya v. Salt Lake County, 852 P. 2d 1007 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) . 
Trial court's retroactive application of the 1987 amendment modifying the 
definition of "governmental function" so as to bar a claim against the Utah 
P.2d 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
injury. 
When state university constructed building, parking lot, and road, diverting 
surface water flow onto adjoining owner's land and basement, landowner was 
"injured" within meaning of this section. Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 
Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971). 
The language "any other injury that a person may suffer,'1 in addition to the 
generalized enumerated categories listed in the definition of "injury," 
indicates an intent to draw a broad net over the multitudinous harms that 
plaintiffs might allege against government officials. Thomas v. Lewis, 2001 UT 
49, 26 P.3d 217. 
School boards. 
A school board is not an arm of the state for purposes of the Eleventh 
Amendment and is consequently not entitled to immunity from § 19 83 suits in 
federal court. Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1993). 
State. 
The University of Utah is an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment immunity 
purposes. Pharmaceutical & Diagnostic Servs., Inc. v. University of Utah, 801 
F. Supp. 508 (D. Utah 1990). 
Cited in Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993); Wright 
v. University of Utah, 876 P. 2d 380 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 883 P. 2d 
1359 (Utah 1994); J.B. v. Washington County, 905 F. Supp. 979 (D. Utah 1995), 
aff'd, 127 F.3d 919 (10th Cir. 1997).; Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 
343 (Utah 1998) . 
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UT ST § 63-30-3 
U.C.A. 1953 § 63-30-3 
UTAH CODE, 195 3 
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
63-30-3 Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of 
a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other 
governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or 
other professional health care clinical training program conducted in either 
public or private facilities. 
(2) Subsections (2)(a) through (c) are unique or essential core governmental 
functions and, notwithstanding the waiver of immunity provisions of Section 63-
30-10, governmental entities, political subdivisions, and their officers and 
employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting from the 
implementation of or the failure to: 
(a) implement measures to control the causes of epidemic and communicable 
diseases and other conditions significantly affecting the public health or 
necessary to protect the public health as set out in Title 26A, Chapter 1, 
Local Health Departments; 
(b) investigate and control suspected bioterrorism and disease as set out 
in Title 26, Chapter 23b, Detection of Public Health Emergencies Act; and 
(c) respond to a national, state, or local emergency, a public health 
emergency as defined in Section 26-23b-102, or a declaration by the 
President of the United States or other federal official requesting public 
health-related activities. 
(3) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following state medical 
programs and services performed at a state-owned university hospital are 
unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this state and 
are considered to be governmental functions: 
of the high risk nature of the patient's medical condition; 
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in Utah only at a state-
owned university hospital or provided in Utah only by physicians 
employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope of their 
employment; 
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive appropriate medical care or 
treatment at another medical facility in Utah; and 
(iv) any other service or procedure performed at a state-owned 
university hospital or by physicians employed at a state-owned 
university acting in the scope of their employment that a court finds 
is unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this 
state. 
(b) If any claim under this Subsection (3) exceeds the limits established 
in Section 63-30-34, the claimant may submit the excess claim to the Board 
of Examiners and the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6. 
(4) The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the 
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental 
entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities 
and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage 
resulting from those activities. 
(5) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center are immune from suit 
for any injury which results from their joint intergovernmental functions at a 
center created in Title 62A, Chapter 4a, Child and Family Services. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 3; 1978, ch. 27, § 2; 1981, ch. 116, § 2; 1984, 
ch. 33, § 1; 1985, ch. 93, § 1; 1991, ch. 15, § 1; 1991, ch. 248, § 7; 2003, 
ch. 3, § 5. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. —The 2003 amendment, effective February 18, 2 003, added 
Subsection (2), redesignating the following subsections accordingly; added 
"(3)" in Subsection (3)(b); and added "Child and Family Services" in Subsection 
(5). 
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It is within power of legislature to impose such conditions upon right to sue 
cities and towns, which are merely arms of state government, as in its judgment 
may seem wise and proper. Berger v. Salt Lake City, 56 Utah 403, 191 P. 23 3, 13 
A.L.R. 5 (1920). 
Building code. 
A city municipal corporation, its agents, and its architectural consultant were 
immune from suit by plaintiffs who had purchased and renovated a hotel in the 
city and in order to enjoy certain tax advantages wanted to obtain an occupancy 
permit, but the city's hired architectural firm reported code violations and 
the city denied the occupancy permit. D.C.A. Dev. Corp. v. Ogden City Mun. 
Corp., 965 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1992). 
Construction and application. 
This section indicates an intention that the act be strictly applied to 
preserve sovereign immunity and to waive it only as clearly expressed therein. 
Holt v. Utah State Rd. Comm. , 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 (1973); Epting v. 
State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976). 
The 1984 amendment to this section could not be applied retroactively.to bar a 
valid cause of action that had already arisen when the amendment went into 
effect. Irvine v. Salt Lake County, 785 P.2d 411 (Utah 1989); Rocky Mt. Thrift 
Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989). 
Drainage system. 
Construction, operation, and maintenance of a creek drainage system was a 
governmental function. Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989) . 
Equitable claims. 
Governmental immunity is not a defense to equitable claims. Bowles v. State ex 
rel. Department of Transp., 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1982); Bennett v. Bow Valley 
P.2d 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Escrowed fund disbursement. 
The supervision of disbursement of escrowed funds is not of such a unique 
nature that it could only be performed by a governmental entity and is not 
essential to the core of governmental activity; therefore, disbursement of 
escrowed funds is not a governmental function for purposes of this section and 
is not subject to the notice requirement of § 63-30-11. Cox v. Utah Mtg. & Loan 
Corp., 716 P.2d 783 (Utah 1986). 
Extent of immunity. 
Classification of operation of governmental entity as "governmental function" 
does not signal unconditional immunity under this section since the grant of 
immunity is expressly subjected to operation of other sections of this act. 
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). 
Failure or omission to act. 
This section provides immunity from suit for injuries resulting from both acts 
of commission and omission involving the exercise of a governmental function. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). 
Financial institution supervision. 
State's supervision of financial institutions is of such a unique nature that 
it can only be performed by a governmental agency and constitutes the exercise 
of a governmental function. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). 
Flood control. 
The grant of immunity for flood control activities under this section is 
subject to the exception mentioned in the first paragraph. Hansen v. Salt Lake 
County, 794 P. 2d 838 (Utah 1990); Provo City Corp. v. State ex rel. Dep' t of 
Transp., 795 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1990). 
In amending this section in 1984, the Legislature intended to specify flood 
control activities as governmental functions, thus bringing those activities 
within the Governmental Immunity Act. Thus, immunity for flood control 
activities under this section is subject to the waiver provisions found in the 
Governmental Immunity Act. Provo City Corp. v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp., 
795 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1990) ; Hamblin v. City of Clearfield, 795 P.2d 1133 (Utah 
1990) . 
Golf courses. 
Operation of a public golf course is not essential to governing and is 
therefore not a governmental operation with result that city is not immune from 
tort liability related to its operation of golf course. Standiford v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980). 
Governmental function. 
A lender's complaint against the State Tax Commission, claiming that the 
commission and its employees negligently failed to advise the lender that a 
duplicate vehicle title had been issued and improperly issued to the borrower 
barred by governmental immunity. The issuance of motor vehicle titles ana 
recordkeeping responsibilities are governmental functions and have immunity 
under this section. Further, the statutory waiver of immunity for negligence 
does not apply, according to § 63-30-10(3), when the alleged injury arises out 
of the issuance of a title certificate. Metropolitan Fin. Co. v. State, 714 
P.2d 293 (Utah 1986). 
The regulation of public safety needs and the evaluation, installation, 
maintenance and improvement of safety signals or devices at railroad crossings 
is a governmental function. Gleave v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
The issuance of permits and certificates of occupancy and the administering of 
building inspections as identified by the legislature in § 63-30-10 are "core" 
governmental functions, so that a county's negligent acts or omissions relating 
to those functions are expressly excepted from waiver of immunity. DeBry v. 
Salt Lake County, 835 P.2d 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), aff'd sub nom. DeBry v. 
Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995). 
County was immune from negligence suit for the alleged injuries resulting from 
county's failure to indemnify state prison psychiatrist for her separately 
incurred defense costs, since under § 63-30-2(4)(a), a governmental entity's 
failure to act is classified as a governmental function. Atiya v. Salt Lake 
County, 852 P.2d 1007 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Driving an emergency vehicle to the scene of a fire is a "governmental 
function" and is therefore presumptively cloaked with immunity. Lyon v. Burton, 
2000 UT 19, 5 P.3d 616. 
Plaintiffs could maintain action against city for alleged negligence in the 
maintenance of power lines, even though maintenance decisions fell within the 
discretionary function exception of § 63-30-10, because § 63-30-2(4)(a) was 
unconstitutional to the extent it made the operation of electrical power 
systems by municipalities a governmental function. Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 
UT 79, 57 P.3d 1007. 
Health care facilities. 
While 197 8 amendment was not expressly made retroactive, the Supreme Court 
considered it a manifestation of legislative intent; for that reason, the court 
held, in a case which arose prior to the amendment, that operation of a 
governmentally owned health care facility such as a university medical center 
was a "governmental function" as contemplated by the statute prior to 
amendment. Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 19 80). 
County mental health facility was a "governmental health care facility" within 
the meaning of this section. Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P. 2d 1053 (Utah 
1989) . 
Hospitals. 
The state's operation of a hospital at a prison facility for treatment of 
prisoners is a governmental function. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978). 
Misrepresentation by city. 
City is immune to tort action for deceit and misrepresentation in its 
competitive advantage had been granted to one corporation. Rapp v. Salt Lake 
City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974). 
Personal liability. 
The Governmental Immunity Act has no application to individuals; however, under 
common-law principles, a governmental agent performing a discretionary function 
is immune from suit for injury arising therefrom, but an employee acting in a 
ministerial capacity is not so protected; psychologist working with university 
medical center on contractual basis and alleged to have been negligent in his 
treatment of suicidal patient was performing ministerial rather than 
discretionary acts, and thus was not afforded immunity from suit. Frank v. 
State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). 
Prisoners. 
Bailiff's action against state for gunshot wound inflicted by a prisoner was 
properly dismissed, because either: (1) the prisoner had totally escaped the 
control of the officers escorting him and was thus acting on his own so the 
officers were not responsible for him, or (2) he was still under the control of 
the officers, in which case the officers would be immune from suit under the 
statute. Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 1255 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Proprietary or governmental function. 
Four factors to be considered in determining whether an activity is a 
proprietary or a governmental function are: (1) whether the activity is 
something that is done for the general public good; (2) whether it is generally 
regarded as a public responsibility; (3) whether there is any special pecuniary 
benefit to the city; and (4) whether it is in competition with free enterprise. 
Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975). 
Recreation. 
Governmental immunity was not a bar to a negligence action against a city for 
injuries sustained by a child when child's sled collided with a post on a city 
owned golf course that was open to the public for sledding in the winter. 
Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 432 (Utah 1981). 
Right to maintain action. 
The right to maintain an action against the state or its political subdivisions 
can result from a finding that the injury did not result from the exercise of a 
governmental function, or from a finding that even though the injury resulted 
from the exercise of a governmental function, the government's immunity has 
been expressly waived. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). 
Schools and school districts. 
School, in pumping water out of its basement, was not engaged as a governmental 
entity in the "management of flood waters" so as to be immune from suit. Branam 
v. Provo School Dist., 780 P.2d 810 (Utah 1989). 
School district was not shielded from possible liability for damages arising 
from its negligence in the resurfacing of a school parking lot, which resulted 
in surface water runoff on an adjoining landowner's property. Williams v. 
Carbon County Bd. of Educ, 780 P.2d 816 (Utah 1989). 
County school district was immune from a negligence suit based on battery 
arising out of the beating of one of its students by two schoolmates, since the 
operation of a public school is a governmental function under § 63-30-2(4)(a). 
Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993). 
Because it is undisputed that the county school district is a governmental 
entity discharging a governmental function, the district would be immune from 
suit for alleged violation of public policy in discharge of employee. Broadbent 
v. Board of Educ. , 910 P.2d 1274 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 917 P.2d 
556 (Utah 1996) . 
Sewer system. 
Governmental immunity was not a bar to an action by property owner against city 
for damage sustained when water backed into his home due to city' s alleged 
negligence in maintaining the sewer system. Thomas v. Clearfield City, 642 P.2d 
737 (Utah 1982) . 
An action for negligence against a sanitary district is not subject to the one-
year limitations period for actions against the government, since operation of 
a sewer system is a nongovernmental function, and thus not protected by 
governmental immunity. Dalton v. Salt Lake Sub. San. Dist., 676 P. 2d 399 (Utah 
1984) . 
Street repair and construction. 
Duty of city to repair or construct streets within its corporate limits is a 
governmental one, and in absence of statute no liability devolves on 
municipality for defective condition of its streets. Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 
100 Utah 573, 111 P.2d 800 (1941) (decided under former law). 
Subdivision plan approval. 
City was immune from a damage suit based on its refusal to approve a 
subdivision plan, since its actions were deemed to be a "governmental 
function." Seal v. Mapleton City, 598 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1979). 
The inspection and acceptance of subdivision improvements are governmental 
functions for which immunity has not been waived. Bennett v. Bow Valley Dev. 
Corp., 797 P.2d 419 (Utah 1990). 
Takings clause claim. 
Governmental immunity does not preclude a suit under Amendment V of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution in a 
proper case. Bennett v. Bow Valley Dev. Corp., 797 P.2d 419 (Utah 1990). 
Test for determining immunity. 
Test for determining governmental immunity is whether the activity under 
consideration is of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a 
governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of governmental 
activity; this new standard broadens governmental liability. However, the 
position is consistent with the plain legislative intent of this chapter to 
expand governmental liability. Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 
1230 (Utah 1980). 
consideration is of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a 
governmental agency, referring not to what government may do but to what 
government alone must do, or that it is essential to the core of governmental 
activity, referring to those activities not unique in themselves but essential 
to the performance of those activities that are uniquely governmental. Johnson 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 432 (Utah 1981). 
Waiver of immunity. 
In Utah, government entities are immune from suit for injury resulting from the 
exercise of governmental functions unless that immunity has been waived by the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act (Act). To determine whether immunity has been 
waived for the particular activity for which a plaintiff is filing a claim, a 
court must determine: (1) whether the activity is a governmental function, for 
which the legislature has granted blanket immunity in Utah Code Ann. § 63- 30-
3; (2) if the activity is an immunized governmental function, whether that 
blanket immunity has been waived in § 63-30-8, 63-30-9, or 63-30-10; and (3) if 
immunity has been waived, whether the Act contains an exception to that waiver 
that would result in the retention of the immunity. Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. 
Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, 42 P.3d 379. 
Water storage tank. 
The maintenance of a water storage tank is not uniquely governmental or 
essential to the core of governmental activity; owners of residential property 
could allege that a city's water storage tanks leaked water into their 
residential subdivision, causing or adding to landslide problems that 
obstructed the free use of their property. Bennett v. Bow Valley Dev. Corp,, 
797 P.2d 419 (Utah 1990) . 
Water system. 
Where city operated water system as a commercial venture in a proprietary 
capacity, it was liable for injuries allegedly suffered by plaintiff when she 
stepped on loose water meter lid whether the meter was on plaintiff's property 
or in the street. Gordon v. Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P.2d 430 (1964). 
Cited in Healthcare Servs. Group v. Utah Dep't of Health, 2002 UT 5, 40 P. 3d 
591. 
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Claims arising from governmental conduct causing damage to plaintiff's real 
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(28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a)), 167 A.L.R. Fed. 1. 
Liability of United States for failure to warn of danger or hazard not directly 
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Liability of United States for failure to warn of danger or hazard resulting 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 63-30-10 
UTAH CODE, 195 3 
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
63-30-10 Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission 
of employee —Exceptions. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not uhe discretion is abused; 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, 
or violation of civil rights; 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure 
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, 
certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or 
negligent inspection; 
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative 
proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; 
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or 
intentional; 
(7) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and 
civil disturbances; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city 
jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any 
condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining 
operation, or any activity authorized by the School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire and State 
Lands; 
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for the 
clearing of fog; 
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters; 
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems; 
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in 
accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14; 
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway, 
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, 
viaduct, or other structure located on them; 
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public 
building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement; 
(18) the activities of: 
(a) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(b) fighting fire; 
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or 
hazardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; 
(e) transporting or removing injured persons to a place where emergency 
medical assistance can be rendered or where the person can be 
transported by a licensed ambulance service; or 
(f) intervening during dam emergencies; or 
(19) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform any 
function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 5a, Dam Safety, or Title 73, 
Chapter 10, Board of Water Resources --Division of Water Resources, which 
immunity is in addition to all other immunities granted by law. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch. 194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, 
ch. 169, § 1; 1989, ch. 185, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 3; 1989, ch. 268, § 29; 
1990, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch. 319, §§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 76, § 4; 1995, ch. 
299, § 35; 1996, ch. 159, § 6; 1996, ch. 264, § 1; 2001, ch. 185, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. —The 2 9 95 amendment, effective May 1, 19 95, substituted 
"School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the Division of 
Sovereign Lands and Forestry" for "Board of State Lands and Forestry" in 
Subsection (11). 
The 199 6 amendment by ch. 15 9, effective July 1, 1996, added "in connection 
with, or results from" to the end of the introductory paragraph; deleted "or 
results from" from the beginning of Subsection (7); deleted "or in connection 
with" from the beginning of Subsection (8); and substituted "Division of 
Forestry, Fire and State Lands" for "Division of Sovereign Lands and Forestry" 
in Subsection (11) . 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 264, effective July 1, 1996, added Subsection (19), 
making a related stylistic change. 
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, added Subsection (18) (e), 
redesignated former Subsection (18)(e) as (f), added chapter titles, and made 
related changes. 
Compiler's Notes. —Laws 1991, ch. 76, which amended this section and §§ 6 3-3 0-
4, 63-30-8, 63-30-9, 63-30-10.5, 63-30-11, 63-30-33, 63-30-34, and 63-30-36, 
provides in § 11 that " This act has prospective effect only and any changes to 
the law caused by this act do not apply to any claims based upon injuries or 
losses that occurred before the effective date of uhis act [April 29, 1991]." 
Cross-References. —Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands, § 65A-1-4. 
Indemnification of public officers and employees, §§ 63-30-36 to 63-30-38. 
School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration, § 53C-1-201 et seq. 
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Constitutionality. 
The University of Utah performs a governmental function under the test 
developed in Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P. 2d 1230 (1980); thus, 
uhe immunity act is not unconstitutional as applied to a person who was injured 
when assaulted and struck by an employee of the University. Wright v. 
University of Utah, 876 P. 2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. ) , cert, denied, 883 P. 2d 1359 
(Utah 1994). 
In retaining governmental immunity from wrongful death suits against the state, 
this section does not abrogate any previously existing right of action and 
therefore does not violate Art. XVI, Sec. 5 of the Utah Constitution. Tiede v. 
State Dep't of Cors., 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996). 
Applicability. 
Before the 1991 amendments to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the 
discretionary function and assault and battery exceptions in this section did 
not apply to the waiver of immunity for defective or dangerous conditions in 
government buildings in § 63-30-9. The amendments were not retroactive. Tavlor 
ex rel. Taylor v. Qaden City Sen. Dist., 881 P. 2d 907 (Utah Ct. APP. 1994 ) , 
rev'd on other grounds, 902 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1995). 
The 1991 amendment of § 60-3 0-8, providing that the waiver provisions thereof 
are subject to the discretionary function exception of this section, does not 
apply retroactively. Keegan v. Spate, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995). 
Approval of plat. 
A city's approval of a subdivision plat was clearly excepted by this section 
from any waiver of immunity, and plaintiff's claim characterizing the city's 
conduct as designing an intersection was effectively barred. De Villiers v. 
Utah County, 882 P.2d 1161 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Assault and battery. 
Subsection (2) provides that the negligence of a governmental employee is not 
actionable when, as a result of that negligence, an assault or battery is 
committed by another. Nothing suggests that the one committing the assault or 
battery need be a government employee, and the entire focus of Subsection (2) 
is upon the negligent government employee, not on the intentionally acting 
assailant. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993). 
This section preserves immunity for negligence that resulted in an injury 
arising out of an assault or battery, even when the alleged negligent 
governmental act was the hiring of the assailant. Petersen v. Board of Educ., 
855 P.2d 241 (Utah 1993) . 
The State, a school district, the State School for the Deaf and Blind, and the 
State Board of Education were exempt under Subsection (6) for injuries 
resulting to plaintiff, a deaf child, who was sexually molested and assaulted 
by a cab driver in taxi hired by the defendants to transport handicapped 
children to school. S.R. ex rei. R.H. v. State, 865 P. 2d 1363 (Utah 1993). 
Notwithstanding allegations that negligent implementation of a prerelease 
program led to plaintiff's injuries by assault and battery at the hands of a 
prerelease inmate, state defendants were immune from suit under the assault and 
battery exception in Subsection (2). Malcolm v. State, 878 P.2d 1144 (Utah 
1994)/ 
Plaintiff's complaint based on injuries received when she was assaulted and 
struck by an employee of the University of Utah and asserting that the injuries 
arose from the University's negligent hiring and supervision of the employee 
rather than from a battery was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim. 
This section focuses on the conduct or situation out of which the injury arose, 
not on the theory of liability crafted by the plaintiff or the type of 
negligence alleged. Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). 
An amendment to a complaint based on injuries received when plaintiff was 
assaulted and struck by an employee of the University of Utah alleging that, 
because of his questionable mental condition, the employee lacked the requisite 
intent for assault and battery, thus making Subsection (2) of this section 
inapplicable, would be a fruitless attempt to circumvent the clear language of 
the section. Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). 
Subsection (2) does not require that the person committing an assault and 
battery must be engaged in a governmental function in order for a government 
entity to qualify for immunity under this section. The immunity act specifies 
only that a court examine generally whether the activity that the governmental 
entity performs is a governmental function under § 63-30-2. Wright v. 
University of Utah, 876 P. 2d 380 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 883 P. 2d 1359 
(Utah 1994). 
This section immunizes the state against a negligence action if "the injury 
arises out of" assault or battery, and according to § 63-30-2, "injury" means 
death, among other things; thus, a governmental entity is immune from a 
negligence action for a death arising out of an assault or a battery. Tiede v. 
State Dep't of Cors., 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996). 
A claim against a school district for injuries to a student caused when he was 
pushed into the window of a school bathroom by another student arose out of an 
assault, and the district was immune from suit under the assault exception. 
Taylor ex rel. Taylor v. Ogden City Sen. Dist., 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996). 
Building certification. 
The issuance of permits and certificates of occupancy and the administering of 
building inspections are "core" governmental functions and a county's negligent 
acts or omissions relating to those functions are expressly excepted from 
waiver of immunity. DeBry v. Salt Lake County, 835 P. 2d 981 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), aff'd sub nom. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995). 
Discretionary function. 
Power of Public Service Commission under § 54-4-14 to require public utiiitv to 
construct and maintain appropriate safety devices at grade crossings is a 
discretionary function, so this section excepts the commission from waiver of 
immunity for injuries caused by failure to require warnings at crossings, 
Velasquez v. Union Pac. R.R. , 24 Utah 2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970). 
The decision of a road supervisor to use berms as the sole method for warning a 
traveler of a cur in an abandoned road was not a basic policy decision 
essential to the realization or accomplishment of some basic governmental 
policy, program, or objective, and therefore was not within the discretionary 
function exception of this section. Carroll v. Stare Rd. Comm., 2~ Utah 2d 384, 
496 P.2d 888 (19^2 ) . 
Although the decision to build a highway and the general location of the 
highway were discretionary functions of the state, preparation of plans and 
specifications and supervision of the manner in which the work was carried out 
were not "discretionary" within the meaning of this section and did not exempt 
state from tort liability. Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975). 
Psychiatric care of an individual patient is a ministerial, rather than a 
discretionary, function. Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 19 80). 
Psychologist working with university medical center on contractual basis and 
alleged to have been negligent in his treatment of suicidal patient was acting 
in a ministerial rather than discretionary capacity and thus was nor immune 
from suit. Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). 
The design of a system of traffic-control semaphores did not involve "the basic 
policy making level" nor constitute a discretionary act for which this section 
would provide immunity to the state in a tort action alleging that dangerously 
designed, constructed and maintained electric traffic-control semaphore caused 
an auto accident resulting in personal injury. Bigeiow v. Ingersoil, 618 P.2d 
5 0 (Utah 19 80) . 
Failure of Department of Transportation to install different safety signals or 
devices at a particular railroad crossing was a purely discretionary function 
within the meaning of Subsection (1). Gleave v. Denver * R.G.W.R.R., 749 P. 2d 
660 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
Alleged negligent conduct of a county employee in operating a backhoe pursuant 
to a regular program of dredging stream channels to clear away silt, gravel 
deposits, debris, and other matter which obstructed the flow of water did not 
fall within the discretionary function exception of Subsection (1). Irvine v. 
Salt Lake County, 7 85 P.2d 411 (Utah 1989). 
Decisions regarding the design, capacity, and construction of a flood control 
system were discretionary functions. Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989). 
Discretionary functions are those requiring evaluation of basic governmental 
policy matters and do not include acts and decisions at the operational level -
-those everyday, routine matters not requiring evaluation of broad policy 
factors. Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990). 
Department of Transportation, which ranks railroad grade crossings in 
allocating the limited funds available for crossing improvements, was immune 
for its failure to do more than minimal warning and control at a crossing where 
P.2d 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), aff'd, 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992). 
The power of the Department of Transportation in determining what type of 
warning devices should be required at railroad crossing is a discretionary 
function which is protected by governmental immunity. Duncan v. Union Pac. 
R.R., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992). 
The Department of Transportation's decision not to raise a concrete barrier 
during highway surface overlay projects was not an operational decision 
involving the negligent installation or maintenance of a traffic device, bur 
involved a policy-based plan and the exercise of judgment and discretion; thus, 
the decision was a discretionary act shielded from liability. Keegan v. State, 
896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995). 
In a suit for damages against the city and the state for negligence in failing 
to maintain a fence separating a playground from the Jordan River, where the 
city and state were aware of the breach in the fence but did not repair it, 
because the negligence alleged related directly to an operational decision on 
the part of the governmental entity responsible for maintaining the fence, it 
was not protected by discretionary function immunity. Nelson ex rel. Stuckman 
v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996). 
In an action for injuries suffered from an attack by a black bear at a 
federally operated campground, where the state's interaction with the federal 
forest service on wildlife matters met the discretionary function test, the 
state was protected from liability by governmental immunity. Gadd ex rel. Gadd 
v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 502 (D. Utah 1997). 
Although the Governmental Immunity Act waives immunity for liabiiiry from 
injuries caused by defective conditions of public buildings and highways, and 
by the negligence of public employees, immunity is retained if, among other 
things, an injury arose out of the exercise of or failure to exercise a 
discretionary function, whether or not that discretion was abused. Trujilio v. 
Utah DOT, 1999 UT App 227, 986 P.2d 752. 
Department of Transportation was nor shielded by discretionary function 
immunity because the plaintiffs' evidence as to the formulation and execution 
of a traffic control plan refuted the contention that the relevant decisions 
were made at the policy level rather than at the operational level. Trujilio v. 
Utah DOT, 1999 UT App 227, 986 P.2d 752. 
In debating the appropriate course of action in expending the city's money to 
improve the public safety of the city railroad crossing, the city acted within 
its statutory authority, and the city's decision involved just the sort of 
policy-driven weighing of costs and benefits that the discretionary function 
exception was meant to protect. Price v. Amtrak, 2 0 00 UT App 333, 14 P.3d 702. 
Plaintiffs could maintain action against city for alleged negligence in the 
maintenance of power lines, even though maintenance decisions fell within the 
discretionary function exception of this section, because § 63-30-2(4)(a) was 
unconstitutional to the extent it made the operation of electrical power 
systems by municipalities a governmental function. Lanev v. Fairview City, 2 002 
UT 79, 5 7 P.3d 10 07> 
Emergency vehicles. 
By enacting this section in 1991, the legislature reestablished the law in 
respect of actions for the negligent operation of emeraencv vphirioc " " ^ ^ 
existed from the time the Governmental Immunity Act was first established. Day 
v. State ex rei. Utah Dep ' t of Pub. Safety, 1999 UT 46, 980 ?.2d 1171. 
Escaped prisoner. 
State had not waived its immunity from suit for negligence in permitting escape 
of state prisoner who subsequently killed plaintiffs1 mother; prisoner had 
escaped from a work release program in which he was placed at the discretion of 
prison authorities; therefore, stage's negligence, if any, arose out of 
exercise of discretionary function and it was immune from suit under Subsection 
(1) of this section; likewise, state was immune under Subsection (10) because 
alleged negligence arose out of escapee's incarceration in a state prison. 
Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976). 
Bailiff's action against state for gunshot wound inflicted by a prisoner was 
properly dismissed, because either: (1) the prisoner had totally escaped the 
control of the officers escorting him and was thus acting on his own so the 
officers were not responsible for him, or (2) he was still under the control of 
the officers, in which case the officers would be immune from suit under the 
statute. Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 1255 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
State was immune from liability for injuries caused by convicted felons during 
an unauthorized departure from a half-way house, even though the state was 
informed of the felons ' whereabouts and intentions but did not apprehend the 
felons or protect the public. Tiede v. State Dep't of Cors., 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 
1996). 
False arrest. 
City was immune from suit claiming that plaintiff was arrested on a bench 
warrant due to city court clerk's failure to enter in the docket book that 
plaintiff had paid his fine. Connell v. Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977). 
Foster care of children. 
Failure of Division of Family Services to properly evaluate a foster home, to 
supervise child's placement and to protect her from harm was a breach of 
conduct implemental in nature, and when found to be negligent entitled the 
parents, upon the death of their child after she was placed in foster care, to 
maintain a wrongful death action against the Division of Family Services, which 
had obtained custody and guardianship of the child and placed her in foster 
care. Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983). 
Hazardous waste. 
School district's activity in venting sewer gas from a school would be entitled 
to immunity as a governmental function under Subsection (18)(c) if the district 
could show that the gas was a hazardous waste under § 19-6-302(7). Lovendahl v. 
Jordan Sch. Dist., 2002 UT 130, 63 P.3d 705. 
Incarceration in state prison. 
Complaint of inmate of state prison for damages from injuries inflicted by 
fellow prisoner was properly dismissed as to state because statute waiving 
sovereign immunity from negligent acts of governmental entities specifically 
excepts injuries arising out of the incarceration of any person in any state 
prison from the operation of the statute; although warden of state prison is 
-J^^.**W.^J wo.^ LI^J u immune iron; 
suit for alleged negligence, complaint against him was properly dismissed under 
common-law rule that where one inmate has injured another, warden and other 
prison officers are protected by doctrine of sovereign immunity against claims 
of negligence so long as they are acting in good faith. Sheffield v. Turner, 21 
Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 (1968). 
The exception of the waiver of governmental immunity for injuries arising out 
of the incarceration of a person in the state prison is not a denial of equal 
protection nor is it against public policy. Madsen v. State, 58 3 P. 2d 9 2 (Utah 
1978) . 
This section barred a wrongful death action against the state and board of 
corrections for death of a prisoner due to alleged negligent treatment of the 
prisoner after surgery in the prison hospital. Madsen v. State, 583 P. 2d 92 
(Utah 1978) . 
State was immune under Subsection (10) of this section from claim of inmate for 
negligent deprivation of property, but individual employees of the state were 
not immune. Schmitt v. Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 19 79). 
This section barred an action by an inmate against the state prison for 
personal injuries he received in a fire at the prison where he was lawfully 
incarcerated. Lancaster v. Utah State Prison, 740 P.2d 261 (Utah 1987). 
Section 63-30-4(4), when combined with Subsection (10) of this section, which 
retains government entities' immunity from liability for injuries arising out 
of incarceration, effectively precludes prisoners from bringing negligence 
actions against the state or prison physicians; however, this classification is 
constitutional. Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1996). 
Injunctions. 
The Utah State Tax Commission, as an agency of the state of Utah, has immunity 
from suits seeking to enjoin an investigation to determine whether a taxpayer 
has violated any provision of the state individual income tax law. Hamilton v. 
Mengel, 629 F. Supp. 1110 (D. Utah 1986). 
Inspections. 
The immunity granted in Subsection (4) was intended to immunize only the 
conclusions and results of an inspection. It was not intended to shield the 
inspector from liability for any negligent acts committed during an inspection. 
Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993). 
Summary judgment for the university on the ground of immunity wTas reversed 
where the university's examination of its stadium bleachers for unsafe 
conditions was an act of maintenance, not inspection under Subsection (4), and 
plaintiff raised a material issue of factual dispute regarding whether the case 
involved a latent defect under Subsection (17). Ilott v. University of Utah, 
2000 UT App 286, 12 P.3d 1011. 
Institution of proceedings. 
The state has not waived its governmental immunity for negligence arising out 
of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, 
even if malicious or without probable cause. Devlin v. Smalley, 4 F. Supp. 2d 
1315 (D. Utah 1998) . 
Defect in a county storm drain that was discoverable by a reasonable inspection 
was not a latent defect. Vincent v. Sal z Lake County, 5S2 P.2d 105 (Utah 1978). 
Legislative intent, 
Since the waiver of immunity in § 63-30-8 and § 63-30-9 encompasses a much 
broader field of tort liability than merely negligent conduct of employees 
within the scope of their employment, the Legislature could not have intended 
that this section, with its exceptions, should modify the preceding two 
sections even though it be conceded that the negligent conduct of an employee 
might be involved in an action for injuries caused by the creation or 
maintenance of a dangerous or defective condition. Sanford v. University of 
Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971). 
Licenses. 
Governmental immunity provisions barred a negligence action against the 
Department of Financial Institutions alleging that the department's failure to 
regulate supervised lenders had resulted in investors' losses, where tne claims 
asserted were for injuries arising out of licensing decisions allegedly made in 
a negligent fashion. Ciiiixian v. Department of Fin. Insts., 782 P.2d 506 (Utah 
1989); Hilton v. Borthick, 791 P.2d 5 04 (Utah 19 89), 
Misrepresentation. 
City is immune to tort action for deceit and misrepresentation in its 
advertisement for construction bids which failed to disclose to bidders that a 
competitive advantage had been granted to one corporation Rapp v,. Salt Lake 
City, 52 7 P. 2d 651 (Utah 19 7 4).. 
Where a complaint alleged fraud against a building official for a county only 
in his representative capacity, because the county could not have been liable 
for injuries arising out of misrepresentation under Subsection (6) of this 
section the building official for the county was likewise protected from 
liability and the complaint failed to state a claim in fraud for which relief 
could have been granted. DeBry v. Salt Lake County, 83 5 P.. 2d 981 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), aff'd sub nom. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995). 
Natural conditions. 
College officials were immune from claims filed by the parents of a student who 
died in a fall from a cliff, because the cause of death was the naturally 
occurring cliffs, not the act of planning a party in the vicinity of the 
cliffs. Apffel v. Huddleston, 50 ?, Supp. 2d 1129 (D, Utah 1999). 
When a plaintiff's injury either arises out of or in connection with or results 
from a natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, governmental 
immunity is retained with respect to any action to recover for injuries 
proximately caused by a government employee's negligence; the application of 
the "natural condition" exception to the waiver of governmental immunity does 
not hinge on whether the natural condition in any way proximately causes the 
plaintiff's injuries.. B] ackner v. State, 2002 UT 44, 48 P.3d 949. 
Under Subsection (11), the "arise out of" language requires only that there be 
some causal nexus between the natural condition and the resultinq iniurv. 
Plaintiff's state law claims against police officers for assault; unlawful 
detention, and intentional infliction of emotional distress were barred by the 
state governmental immunity act. Oliver v. woods; 2,1. ?. Supp, 2d 1325 (D. Utah 
1998). 
Public school. 
In negligence suit for battery arising out of a public school beating of a 
student by two schoolmates, the county school district was immune from 
liabilitv, 
Release from detention. 
In a guardian's suit on behalf of her ward, who was assaulted by a juvenile, 
summary judgment for the state and a Youth Detention Center superintendent was 
reversed and remanded for a trial to determine whether the ward's injuries 
resulted from the superintendent's negligence in monitoring prescribed 
treatment after making a discretionary decision to release the juvenile into 
the community. Mary Doe v. Argueiles, 716 P.2d 27Q (Utah 1985). 
Sale of recovered stolen property. 
Where plaintiff's motorcycle was stolen,, recovered, held for -rial of alleged 
thief, then sold by State Tax Commission without notice to plaintiff (who never 
received notice letter), the motorcycle's sale did not involve such exercise of 
"basic policy evaluation" as to make it a discretionary decision under 
Subsection (1) of this section, but rather the decision to sell was an 
operation function and not immune from attack; also, since defendant tax 
commission never claimed taxes were owing on the motorcycle and no taxes were 
deducted from, the sale price, and since the motorcycle was being held as 
evidence in a criminal prosecution, the commission could not claim immunity on 
basis of the tax exception under Subsection (8) of this section. Morrison v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 600 P.2d 553 (Utah 1979). 
Like local school districts, the state school for the deaf and blind shares in 
state sovereign immunity. Sutton, v. Utah State School for the Deaf k Blind, 17 3 
F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1999) , 
Sovereign immunity. 
Acts that are core governmental functions or are unique to government are 
outside the protection of Utah Const., Art 1., Sec. 11; thus, in an action 
against a county building official and the county for injuries based on 
negligent inspection of a building and fraudulent issuance of a building 
permit, the defendants' acts were core governmental functions within the scope 
of the exceptions to waiver of immunity in Subsections (3) and (4). DeBrv v. 
Noble, 889 P. 2d 428 (Utah 1.995) . 
Subsections (3) and (4) of § 63-30-4 contemplate that a government employee can 
be sued for fraud even if the employee acted in. a representative capacity; 
thus, even though the governmental agency may be immune from liability under 
this section, an employee who commits fraud in the course of his employment can 
State hospital patient. 
State was immune from liability for wrongful death of patient who voluntarily 
entered state hospital since she was "incarcerated" or "confined" within the 
meaning of this section? "other place of legal confinement" includes the 
hospital. The fact that decedent was voluntary patient did not preclude 
conclusion that she was "incarcerated" since she had not sought release and had 
she done so, superintendent could obtain court order preventing her release. 
Emery v. State, 26 Utah 2d 1, 483 P.2d 1296 (1971). 
State's immunity from suit was waived under this section in action alleging 
negligent treatment of suicidal patient by psychiatrist and psychologist at 
university medical center. Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). 
Trees negligently cut. 
City and sidewalk contractor were liable for damage sustained by abutting 
homeowner when trees were blown down as result of unnecessary and negligent 
cutting of roots. Morris v. Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 474, 101 P. 373 (1909). 
Vehicle title certificate. 
A lender's complaint against the State Tax Commission, claiming that the 
commission and its employees negligently failed to advise the lender that a 
duplicate vehicle title had been issued and that it had improperly issued to 
the borrower the title certificate upon which the lender relied in making its 
loan, was barred by governmental immunity. The issuance of motor vehicle titles 
and recordkeeping responsibilities are governmental functions and have immunity 
under § 63-30-3. Further, the statutory waiver of immunity for negligence does 
not apply, under Subsection (3) of this section, when the alleged injury arises 
out of the issuance of a title certificate. Metropolitan Fin. Co. v. State, 714 
P.2d 293 (Utah 1986) . 
Cited in Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P. 2d 126 (Utah 1987); Maddocks v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 740 P. 2d 1337 (Utah 1987); Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 
P.2d 763 (Utah 1987); Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989); 
Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991); Bruner v. Rasmussen, 792 F. Supp. 731 
(D. Utah 1992); Day v. State, ex rel. Utah Dep't of Pub. Safety, 882 P.2d 1150 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994); Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
887 P.2d 848 (Utah 1994); Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm' n, 945 P. 2d 125 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997); Healthcare Servs. Group 
v. Utah Dep't of Health, 2002 UT 5, 40 P.3d 591; Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete 
County, 2002 UT 17, 42 P.3d 379. 
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CHAPTEE IX. 
OF THE ACTION FOE CAUSING DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT, NEGLECT 
OB DEFAULT. 
SECTION. SECTION . 
1216. Company or persons liable for 1217. Action to be broug'nt by personal 
damages. representative. 
An Act providing damages for death caused by wrongrf til act, neglect or default. 
[Approved FeoruaTii 20.1874..] 
(1216.) SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the Governor and Legis - Company or 
__ *' T>erson liable 
lative Assembly of the Territory of Utah; That whenever the for damans. 
death of a person shall be caused by "wrongful act, neglect or 
default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if 
the death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to 
maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, 
then, and in every such case, the person who, or the com-
pany or corporation which, would have been liable if death 
h^d not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, 
notwithstanding the death of the personanjured, and al-
though the death shall have been caused under such cir-
cumstances as amount; in law to felony. 
(1217.) SEC 2. That every such action shall be brought £rc^° t^tob£e 
by, and in the names of the personal representatives of such ^entativeT* 
deceased person, and the amount received in every such 
action shall be distributed by direction and decree of the 
proper probate court, to such persons (other than creditors) 
as are by law entitled to distributive shares of the estate of
 s 
such deceased person, and in such proportions as are pre-
scribed by law : Provided, that every such action shall be 
commenced within two years after the death of such de-
ceased person : And provided further, that the damages 
so recovered shall not in any case exceed the sum of ten 
thousand dollars. 
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CHAPTER I. 
DEATH BY NEGLIGENCE. 
SECTIOK . S KCTI o x. 
2961 Company or persons liable for 2902 Action to be brought by personal 
damages. representative. 
« 2961. ^16) Whenever the death of a person shall be p^J^ ti^Se-
caused by wronrful act. nesrlect or default, and the act. f o r d a t n a ? e s -
&
 _ ' ^
 t ' Feb 20,1874. 
neglect or default is such as would, if the death had not 
ensued, have entitled the partj" injured to maintain an action 
and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in even7 
such case, the person who, or the company or corporation 
which would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall 
be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death 
of the person injured, and although the death shall have been 
caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony. 
§ 2962. CI217) That every such action shall be brought Action to be 
by, and in the names of the personal representatives of such personal rep-
/ . . resentatives. 
.deceased person, and the amount received in every such action 
shall be . distributed ,by direction and decree of the proper 
probate court, to such persons (other than creditors) as are 
by law entitled to distributive shares of the estate of such 
deceased person, and in such proportions as are prescribed by 
law; Provided, That every such action shall be commenced 
within two years after the death of such deceased person; 
And provided further, That the damages so recovered shall 
not in any case exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars. 
PARTIES TO Ciy iL ACTIONS. ZcL 
that age, upon the application of a relative or friend of the 
infant. 
2. "When the infant is defendant, upon the application 
of the infant, if he be of the age of fourteen years, and 
applr within ten days after the semce of the summons, or if 
under that age. or if he neglect so to apply, then upon the 
application of a relative or friend of the infant, or of any 
other party to the action. 
3. When an insane or incompetent person is party to 
an action or proceeding, upon the application of a relative or 
friend of such insane or incompetent person, or of any other 
party to the action or proceeding. 
§ 3176. s 231. An unmarried female under twenty
 U n m a m e d fe. 
years of age at the time of her seduction may prosecute, as JSr^ erowaBe-
plaintiff, an action therefor, and may recover therein such 
damages, pecuniary or exemplary, as are assessed in her favor. 
§ 3177. s 232. A father, or in case of his death or
 F a t h e i etc>5 
desertion of his family, the mother may prosecute as plaintiff a^ucSon°of 
for the seduction of the daughter, who at the time of her Qan*nter'etc-
seduction is under the age of majority: and the guardian for 
the seduction of the ward, who is at the time of her seduction 
under the age of majority, though the daughter or the ward 
be not living with or in the service of the plaintiff at the time 
of the seduction, or afterwards, and there be no loss of 
service. 
§ 3178. s 233. A father, or in case of his death or
 W h 0 maT Bne 
desertion of his family, the mother may maintain an action^ath^&hSd 
for the death or injury of a minor child; and a guardian for 
the injury or death of his ward, when such injury or death 
is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another. Such 
action may be maintained against the person causing the 
injury or death, or if such person be employed by another 
person who is responsible for his conduct, also against such 
other person. 
§ 3179. s 234. When the death of a person not being awhenrepre-
•) \ j_\ r i J i , * i ^ sentative may 
minor is Gaused by the wrongful act or neglect oi another, sue 
his heirs or personal representative^ may maintain an action 
for damages against the person causing the death, or if such 
person be employed bjT another person who is responsible for 
his conduct, then also against such other person. In every
 J > a m g 
action under this and the preceding section, such damages 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL GRAPPENDORF, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF PLEASANT GROVE, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Date: March 29, 2005 
Case No.: 030404102 
Division \TI: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter comes before the court on various motions. A hearing was held on February 
28, 2005, where the court heard the motion of Defendant Pleasant Grove City ("Pleasant Grove") 
for summary judgment. Several related motions are also outstanding. Before discussing the 
merits of the summary judgment motion, it is necessary to clarify the status of the related 
motions. 
Procedural Posture 
Four motions are considered in this decision. First, Pleasant Grove filed its motion for 
summary judgment on October 21, 2004. The motion was fully briefed and a decision was 
requested on November 16, 2004. Second, the Plamtiffs filed a motion to continue the summary 
judgment motion under Rule 56(f). It also was fully briefed, and a decision was requested on 
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January 24. 2005. Third, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their opposition to the October 
summary judgment motion on January 25, 2005. The Plaintiffs original opposition 
memorandum was filed on November 11. 2004, and Plaintiffs seek to supplement that first 
memorandum with new argument. Attached to the motion is the proposed supplemental 
opposition. This motion has not been fully briefed, and no decision has been requested. Fourth, 
Pleasant Grove filed a motion to strike the Plaintiffs' motion to amend on January 26, 2005. This 
motion also has not been fully briefed, and no decision has been requested. 
The second motion (the motion to postpone) is moot because the court finds that there is 
no need for additional discovery for the summary judgment motion. Indeed, as discussed below, 
there are no issues of material fact which discover}7 could resolve. 
As to the third and~foufth motions (to amendTne opposition, andTo^BfiEe^ie motion to 
amend), under ordinary circumstances, the court will not rule on a motion until it has been folly 
briefed and a party requests that the court rule on the motion.1 However, in this case, the third 
and fourth motions are, in substance, further briefing on the original motion for summary 
judgment. The Plaintiffs initially opposed summary judgment by arguing that the statute upon 
which Pleasant Grove relies is inapplicable. In the motion to amend, the Plaintiffs argue that the 
1
 U.R.CP. 7(d). 
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statute is unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution.2 The fourth motion contains, among 
other things, Pleasant Grove's response to the Plaintiffs' constitutional arguments. 
When taken together, the substance of these two motions is further argument for and 
against summary judgment for Pleasant Grove. No further briefing on the motion to amend is 
required, because Pleasant Grove's motion to strike amounts to a thorough reply to the 
constitution arguments raised in the motion to amend. The motion to amend is GRANTED. 
Additionally, the motion to strike is DENIED. The filed documents on both these motions will be 
treated as supplemental opposition and reply memoranda to Pleasant Grove's motion for 
summary judgment. 
Pleasant Grove's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Consistent with the preceding section, the court now considers Pleasantlafo^'^Dctobef 
2004, motion for summary judgment. Initial briefing was completed on November 16, 2004. 
Supplemental briefing was made through two additional motions, both brought in January. 2005. 
The parties initially requested a decision on the summary7 judgment motion in November, 2004, 
and a hearing was held before the court on February 28, 2005. Having fully considered the 
memoranda and oral arguments, as well as the applicable law, the court issues this memorandum 
decision. Pleasant Grove's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 
2
 The Plaintiffs characterize their motion to amend as an attempt to "address a misstatement of law in 
Defendant's memorandum." Motion to Amend, filed January 25, 2005, p. 1. However, the attached "Supplemental 
Memorandum" goes far beyond correcting any characterization of the law that Pleasant Grove has put forward. 
Rather, Plaintiffs introduce a novel legal theory to defeat Pleasant Grove's claim for immunity. 
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Summary Judgment Standard 
Summary judgment"shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party7 is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." U.R.C.P. 56(c). In considering such a motion, "the [undisputed] facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom [are viewed] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party " Jackson v. Mateus, 70 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 2003) (internal citations omitted). 
Factual Background 
For this motion, the parties do not dispute the facts and circumstances giving rise to this 
lawsuit.3 Pleasant Grove is a city in Utah and owns and operates a recreation venue called 
^Discovery PartBasebail DiamoM^or'Tvlanila Fiekfc4*" To accommodate baseball and softbat 
game play, Pleasant Grove purchased and used a moveable pitching mound. This mound had 
been chained to a fence by a Pleasant Grove employee, and, in June of 2002 a forceful wind gust 
lifted the mound, causing it to strike Daniel A. Grappendorf who sustained fatal injuries. Other 
facts recited in the briefing on this motion are immaterial.4 
Pleasant Grove argues that, under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, U.C.A. § 63-30-
" "Plaintiffs do not generally disagree with any of [Pleasant Grove's stated] facts . . . ." Memorandum in 
Opposition, filed by Plaintiffs on November 4, 2004, § LA. 
4
 The Plaintiffs recite extensive facts relative to Pleasant Grove's alleged negligence. See Memorandum in 
Opposition § LB. 1—3. For purposes of this motion, the court may assume that Pleasant Grove was negligent. 
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1 et seq. (as amended through 2002). it is entitled to immunity from suit arising from its alleged 
negligence.5 First. Pleasant Grove acknowledges that ,r[i]ramunit}- from sui t . . . is waived for 
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee" of the government 
acting within the scope of employment § 63-30-10 (2002). However, immunity from suits for 
negligence is not waived frif the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: . . . (11) 
any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands . . . ." § 63-30-10(11) (2002). 
Pleasant Grove asserts that the wind gust which lifted the pitching mound and caused it to strike 
Daniel Grappendorf is a "natural condition" under the Code, and immunity7 from suit is retained 
by the city. 
The Plaintiffs reply on two general grounds: (1) the statutory exception to the immunity 
wMvef^toesnot^^ 
Constitution if applied to grant Pleasant Grove immunity and so must not be enforced. The 
statutory argument must be considered before the court may reach the constitutional argument.6 
Plaintiffs' Statutory Argument 
The determination whether a governmental entity is immune from suit entails a three-part 
5
 The Utah Governmental Immunity Act was repealed in 2004 and replaced by the Governmental 
Immunity Act of Utah, U.C.A. § 63-30d-101 et seq. (2004). However, the prior act governs these alleged injuries 
because they occurred in 2002. 
6
 Laney v. Parmew City, 2002 UT 79 H 7, 57 P.3d 1007. 1011 ("the courts should pass upon the 
constitutionality of a statute only when such a detenrjination is essential to the decision in a case") (quoting Hoyle v. 
Monson, 606 P.2d 240. 242 (Utah 1980)). Here, if Pleasant Grove is not entitled to rrnmuriity under the statute, 
there will be no need to consider the constitutionality of the statute. 
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analysis: (1) Is the activity a "governmental function1' covered by the general grant of immunity 
under § 63-30-3? (2) If so. does the immunity7 act waive immunity' as to the activity in question? 
(3) If liability7 has been waived, does the immunity7 act except the activity in question from the 
waiver of immunity?7 
Governmental function. LLC A. § 63-30-3 (2002) contains a general gram of immunity 
from suit for all governmental entities "for any injur)' which results from the exercise of a 
governmental function . . . ." A city such as Pleasant Grove is a governmental entity for 
purposes of the immunity7 act.8 A "governmental function" is "any act failure to act operation, 
function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not. . . governmental proprietary, a 
core governmental function, unique to government, undertaken m a dual capacity, essential to or 
net-e^-en^f-ta^-^^^ 
enterprise or private persons."5 It is undisputed that Pleasant Grove is a city and that the 
maintenance and operation of Manila Field is a "governmental function" under this definition.10 
Immunity waiver. U.C.A. § 63-30-10 (2002) contains a general waiver of immunity for 
7
 Lovendahl v. Jordan School District. 2002 UT 130 % 15, 63 P.3d 705, 709 (Utah 2002) (citing Ledfors v. 
Emery County School District 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1993)). 
8
 U.CA. § 63-30-2(3) & (7). 
9
 Id § 63-30-2(4)(a). 
10
 "Pleasant Grove's proposed application of § 63-30-2(4)(a) is consistent with the statutory language . . . 
." Addendum 1 to Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend at 6. 
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"injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the 
scope of employment. . . ." Here, the Plaintiffs allege negligence, and. for purposes of this 
motion, the court assumes that Pleasant Grove was negligent Therefore, immunity from suit 
would be waived under § 63-30-10. 
Exception to immunity waiver. U.C A. §63-30-10(1)—(19) contains various exceptions to 
the waiver of immunity for negligence actions. Pleasant Grove relies on § 63-30-10(11) which 
retains immunity for governmental activities "aris[ing] out of, in connection with, or resulting] 
from: . . . (11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands . . . ." The Plaintiffs 
do not dispute that Manila Field is "publicly owned or controlled land." The) argue, however. 
that the natural condition exception does not apply. 
B 3 a i t o a = & a ^ ^ frrRiackner 
an avalanche blocked a portion of a public road in Little Cottonwood Canyon. While city and 
state employees worked to clear the avalanche and to safel}' route traffic during the clearing, an 
Alta deputy marshal instructed the plaintiff Mr. Blackner, along with others, to stop their 
vehicles. He did so. and then stood orfthe roadside observing the road clearing. A UDOT 
avalanche forecaster notified the deputy marshal that he was concerned about the potential for 
another avalanche in the area where Mr. Blackner and the other drivers were stopped. Soon, a 
second avalanche occurred and Mr. Blackner was injured. Both avalanches originated on 
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National Forest Sendee land.11 Mr. Blackner sued various governmental entities, but the trial 
court granted summary judgment under U.C.A. § 63-30-10(11), the natural condition exception.12 
Mr. Blackner appealed, arguing that the natural condition exception should not apply 
because the defendants' negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries. The Utah Supreme 
Court rejected this argument because, under the plain language of the immunity act, ,f[t]he 
application of the 'natural condition' exception . . , does not hinge on whether the \ . . condition' 
in any way 'proximately caused' the plaintiffs injuries/'13 The court farther found that the f'arise 
out of language "requires only that there be some causal nexus between the risk and the 
resulting injury."14 The court found that "[t]he first avalanche and the snow pack . . . were 
natural conditions" and Mr. Blackner1 s injuries "arose out of the snow pack and the first 
^rv^BnTThF^^-Thg-nc >urf fi i i i r r rh l ra^ Rlactmer 
would not have suffered injury" because "were it not for the first avalanche, [the marshal] would 
not have stopped [Mr.] Blackner and others" on the road.16 Under these circumstances, Mr. 
11
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Blacknefs injuries "arose out of, were in connection with, or resulted from,! a natural condition, 
and the exception to immunity applied.1' 
The Plaintiffs argue that the present case is distinguishable from Blackner and is, instead, 
controlled by the earlier case Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996). The}'- argue 
that in Blackner. the exception applied because it was a natural occurrence, the second avalanche, 
that actually injured Mr. Blackner. Here, they argue, the instrumentality of injury was an 
artificial baseball pitching mound which is not "natural1' and is not a "condition." However, 
Blackner does not require the court, to consider the physical cause of injury to the Plaintiffs. 
Rather, if the injury arose out of circumstances where a natural condition was a "but for" cause, 
the statute applies.18 The Blackner decision speaks specifically about the first avalanche and its 
was the physical cause of the injur}'.19 In this light, the Plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish Blackner 
is unavailing. The proper application of the Blackner analysis in the present case is that but for 
the sudden gust of wind, the injury would not have arose. Under Blackner. the particular 
Id ff 16-17. 
18
 Blackner, supra.f 15-17. 
19
 In paragraphs 14 & 15 of Blackner, the words ''second avalanche" are not used at all; "both avalanches" 
are used only once (in describing the snowpack); "either avalanche" are used only once; but the words "first 
avalanche" are used four times, including "Blackner's injuries arose out of the snow pack and the first avalanche." 
Id. % 15 (emphasis added). The clear focus of the court's inquiry was as to the first avalanche as a but-for cause of 
Mr. Blackner's injuries, not as to the physical results of the second avalanche. 
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instrumentality of the injury appears to be irrelevant if there is a but-for natural condition cause 
of the injury. 
Further, Nelson v. Salt Lake Citv is inapplicable to this case In 1990. Joseph Nelson and 
his mother were in Riverside Park in Salt Lake City. Joseph was left to play in a playground in a 
park adjacent to the Jordan River Parkway, which provides open access to the Jordan River A 
four foot fence had been erected, but a gate in the fence had been broken and not replaced. Both 
Salt Lake City and the State of Utah knew of the missing gate, but neither entity took action to 
repair the fence.20 Joseph was injured in the Jordan River. The trial court granted summary 
judgment to Salt Lake City and the State under the natural condition exception of the 
governmental immunity act.2^ The plaintiffs appealed arguing that the cause of Joseph Nelson's 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The court first found that 
"governmental entities] ha[ve] no general duty to fence in waterways" such as the Jordan River. 
which was the natural condition at issue.22 However, because "the City or State undertook to 
provide protection'Tbr park visitors ffonnhFP^kvrayand Jordan River7they"are "obligated to 
11
 Nelson v. Salt Lake Citv, 919 P.2d 568, 570-71 (Utah 1996). 
21
 The trial court also granted summary judgment under the discretionary function exception of U.CA § 
63-60-10(1). Nelson, 919 P.2d at 575. This provision of the immunity act has not been asserted in the present case. 
22
 Id. at 573. 
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exercise reasonable care in maintaining the fence."23 The government's decision to attempt to 
protect park visitors from a particular natural condition (the Jordan River) took the case out of § 
63-3040(11). 
This is not true m the present case. The assertions in the file demonstrate that the 
pitching mounds' placement against the chain link fence was intended as a protective measure.24 
However, there is no allegation that the protective effort was undertaken to protect Manila Field 
patrons from sudden and unpredictable gusts of wind or from any other natural condition. The 
filed documents assert that the pitching mound was chained to keep ,l somebody [from being] 
injured while jumping . . . bikes/125 This remedial action, them was not to protect against the 
particular natural condition in question as was the case in Nelson. The Nelson case is 
"inapplicEble^ 
Therefore, under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act as in effect in 2002. Defendant 
23
 I i a t 5 7 5 . 
^
4
 See Exhibit 2 to the Memorandum in Opposition. 
2:5
 Id. The Plaintiffs also allege that the mound was secured to the fence to avoid it being stolen or tipped 
over. The court has reviewed Exhibit 2 and does not fmd language to support this assertion. Furthermore. Exhibit 2 
is not an affidavit of Paul Scoonover and is replete with inadmissible hearsay. For example, though the exhibit 
contains Mr. Scoonovefs "description" of the events at Manila Field when Darnel Grappendorf was fatally injured, 
he clearly stated on page 7 that he "wasn't there. I was up in Salt Lake." Id, Obviously, he has no eye-witness, 
first-hand knowledge of what transpired in Pleasant Grove while he was Salt Lake This exhibit, filed without 
foundation, may not be considered by this court m any event. U.R.C.P. 12 allows the court to consider "pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits. . . . " This and the 
Plaintiffs similar exhibits appear to be transcripts of telephone conversanons and are not any of those items listed in 
Rule 12. 
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Pleasant Grove City is entitled to immunity from suit for negligence in this case because, by 
operation of U.C.A. § 63-30-10(11), the city's immunity' for negligence is not waived. 
Plaintiffs' Constitutional Argument 
The Plaintiffs argue that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act thus applied violates 
Article I § 11 and Article XVI § 5 of the Utah Constitution. In particular, the}' argue that the 
definition of"governmental function" in § 63-30-2(4)(a), which was enacted in 1987. is 
unconstitutionally overbroad. They rely principally on Lanev v. Fairview Citv. 2002 UT 795 57 
P.3d 1007.26 
In Lanev. a man was electrocuted and killed while moving metal irrigation piping that 
either came into contact with or came within arcing distance of power lines ovraed and operated 
5y FMrvJewtTit^ brought a wrongful death suit which was dismissed af. 
trial under an exception to the waiver of immunity for negligence actions for "discretionary 
functions" of the government.27 In applying the Ledfors three-part test2S to determine the 
immunity question, the trial court found that Fairview's decision not to improve the power lines 
or post warning signs on them was a discretionary governmental function entitled to immunity; 
26
 The Lanev decision does not address Article XVI § 5. This section is part of the article on "Labor." No 
party has cited any cases demonstrating that this section applies in the present action. As such, this decision 
addresses only Article I § 11. 
27
 Lanev supra,. % 4 (citing U.CA. § 63-30-10(1) (1997)). 
See note 7, supra. 
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that the immunity was waived by statute because the claim was for negligence; but, that the 
statutor}* provision previously cited excepted the case from the waiver of immunity'.20 The 
Plaintiffs appealed on the ground that the statute violated Article I § 11 of the Utah 
Constitution.30 Before deciding the constitutional question, the Utah Supreme Coun engaged in 
a lengthy statutor}' analysis.51 The court concluded that Fairview was entitled to immunity under 
the statutory framework.32 
The court then analyzed the statute itself under .Article I § 1L the so-called "open courts" 
clause. That clause reads as follows: 
All courts shall be open, and ever}' person, for an injur}7 done to him in his person, 
property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. which shall be 
administered without demal or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this state, by himself or counsel any civil 
gaixse~to^',hiclrSe is"a"party^" 
The coun engages in a lengthy discussion of the history and purpose of the "open conns" clause. 
ultimately finding that the clause provides "substantive rights to remedies." and has done so 
Lanev. supra % 5 & n. 4. 
30
 It appears that the Plaintiffs did not argue Article XVI § 5 on appeal Id_ ^ " 6. 
31
 ML Iff 7-26. 
32
 Id ^26. 
Utah Constitution, .Article I § 5: Laney, supra, at % 28. 
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"throughout our state's history.'*34 Other constitutional provisions, including .Article XVI § 5, 
provide similar substantive rights.35 The court emphasized that Article I § 11 "imposes some 
limits on the legislature1' to limit claims brought in state court.36 When "[a] legislative enactment 
. . . does not eliminate a remedy[. it] is not unconstitutional under the open courts provision."3" 
However, if a statute does abrogate a cause of action, it should be analyzed under the framework 
established in Bern' v. Beech .Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). which is expressly 
confirmed in Lanev.3£ to determine if it contravenes the state constitution. 
As a preliminary matter, application of the Lanev decision is challenging for at least four 
reasons. First, that decision expressly limited itself: "the 1987 amendment, declaring all acts of 
municipalities to be governmental functions, is unconstitutional as applied to municipalities 
"(grating"electrical power systems;* "the amendment is arbitrary and unreasonable when applied. 
to the operation of a municipal power system, where a high duty of care is imposed:" "we 
express no opinion on the constitutionality of the amendment as applied to other municipal 
* Laney. supra, at ffij 30-33. 
35
 Id at U 34. 
36
 I±atffi30, 37. See also T^ 41-42, discussing Brown v. Wighrmaiu 151 P. 366 fUtah 19151 
J /
 Laney, supra at % 49 (citing Utah Constitution Article I § 11). 
* "This court. . . continue[s] to apply the Berry analysis with absolute!}' no reservations . . . " Laney, 
supra, at \ 44. 
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activities 
Second, the Lanev lead opinion's analysis is joined only by two justices and thus 
represents a plurality analysis.40 The other concurring justices endorsed a different analysis not 
argued here. 
Third, the immunity sought to be retained in Laney was urged based on an exception to 
immunity quite different from the one presently before the court, and it is not clear how this court 
must proceed when, as here, "a lower standard of care may apply and different considerations 
may be relevant."41 Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court suggested in Laney that, notwithstanding 
Lanev. supra at ^ 1 & 71 (emphasis added). Further, the Utah Supreme Court prefaced its analysis 
with a reference to Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Association. 470 P.2d 393 (1970) and its clear statement that 
"[a] high tension transmission wire is one of the most dangerous things known to man." Id. at *\ 64. The concurring 
opinion echoesjhis hrninng language. See id. at ^ 81 -83. 
40
 Id, at TIT 73-74. 83-84. Chief Justice Durham authored the lead opinion which contains the 
complicated analysis urged by the Plaintiffs here, and Justice Howe joined in that opinion. Justice Russon concurs 
in the result but on differing analytical grounds, and Justice Wilkins joined that concurrence. Justices Wilkins and 
Associate Chief Justice Durrani also dissented at great length. See id, at ^ 84-139. Justice Russon's concurrence 
opposes the lead opinion's conclusion that the legislature can abrogate an existing cause of action if it meets the 
Berry test. Id. at % 74. 
4i
 Id..at ^ J2,__Exceptions .to the .waiver of immunity for negligence are myriad, but the one before the 
court in this case is unique among them. The other exceptions deal primarily with the particular class or type of 
activity the government is engaged in. to wit (1) a ,(discretionary function"; (2) intentional torts and other specific 
torts; (3) actions related to state licenses, certificates and the like; (4) actions related to inspections; (5) rnstitunng 
and prosecuting judicial and other proceedings; (6) misrepresentations; (7) government actions related to nots and 
other unlawful activities; (8) actions related to the collection of taxes; (10) actions related to incarcerations; (11) (in 
part) actions related to mines or mining operations; (12) actions related to cloud management; (13; actions relative 
to management of flood waters and other natural disasters); and so on. U.C.A. § 63-30-10(1 >—(19). But the '''natural 
condition" exception of subsection (10) is quite different. It does not purport to retain immunity for any particular 
class or type of governmental activities; rather, it appears to retain immunity for any negligent government activity7. 
whether or not listed in other exceptions, so long as a condition of nature was a but-for cause of the injury suffered. 
That is, the kind or type of activity appears to be irrelevant for purposes of subsection (11). This differs from 
Lanev. where retention of immunity was sought under subsection (1) for discretionary functions, which are a 
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the statute- and precedent-based definitions of "governmental function" under consideration, the 
degree of risk involved in a particular governmental activit} may be a relevant factor.42 
Fourth, while the Utah Supreme Court has noted possible latent constitutional problems 
with the immunity statute.43 decisions subsequent to Lane\ may mdicate that the court does not 
intend Lane\ to have the sweeping effect the Plaintiffs ask for here M 
Elimination of a Remedy Prior to the 1987 enactment of the definition in § 63-30-
2(4)fa). ,r[o]nly those activities determined to be governmental functions were afforded 
immunity;" those that were considered "proprietary functions" were not/' In Standiford v Salt 
Lake Citv Corp.. the Utah Supreme Court held that a governmental function is one "of such a 
particular kind of acnvity See also the hste of enumerated exceptions ID Lovendahl ^ Jordan School District, 2002 
TrrnoT^Ti.r-
42
 "We express no opinion on the constitutionahty of the amendment as applied to other municipal 
activities smce a lower standard of care ma> apply " Id, at ^ 71 This and other Lane\ language suggests that the 
"vastly greater' potential for injury resulting from uninsulated power hues than in "the operation of a sewer 
system and a golf course" ma> have been an important consideration in Lanev Id, at ^ 69 So. in decidmg the 
constitutionality of the statutory definition of government funcnon. the court may have at least partial!} considered 
the duty7 attendant to a particular municipal activity. Hov\ this is relevant in deterrmnmg if aD acnvity is "of such a 
unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of 
~governmentol~activity"-;;-:me definition~of a "governmental function" from 1980 through the time of the 1987 
amendment here in question—-is not clear Id, at 1^ 51 (quoting Standiford v Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 
1236-37 (Utah 1980)). 
43
 See e ^ Hansen v Salt Lake Cm. 794 P.2d 838. 845 (Utah 1965) 
44
 In Lovendahl v Jordan School District 2002 UT 130. 63 P.3d 705. decided five months after Lane\. 
the court did not address the constitutionahty of the rrrrmunity statute's definition of "governmental function" Even 
though it appears that the appellant did not raise a constitutional argument, the court did not apply Laney This may 
suggest a cautious approach to invalidating sections of the iirimunity act 
45
 I da tT51 . 
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unique nature that it can onh be performed by a governmental agency or . is essential to the 
core of governmental activity-f'46 The court has noted that "it is not possible to define precisely 
the scope of governmental immunity doctrine m 1896 [the year the Utah Constitution was 
adopted] because of the paucity of cases" and that Standiford "refoeused the legal analysis for 
determinmg governmental liability to take into account considerations relevant to the task of 
providing necessary protection for essential governmental activities M4~ 
The Plaintiffs here have not offered any authority• indicating how the Standiford 
definition should be applied in determining whether or not a cause action was abrogated by the 
legislative enactment.48 Pleasant Grove has likewise cited no authority which ma\ answer this 
question49 Particularly, neither party has offered any authority establishing the status of a city's 
Standiford. supra at 1236-3 n The court openh acknowledged that in embracing this definition it was 
"redefining 'governmental function'" and that this is a ?ne\* standard [which would" broadenP governmental 
liability " It found mat this approach was ' consistent with the plain legislative mtent in [then then-effective] § 63-
30-1 et seq to expand governmental habilm " Id, This presents yet another challenge in applying Lane> and Berry 
if the legislature abrogates an existing cause of action, tins ma\ contravene Article I § 11 But if such a cause of 
action only exists because it was created by the judiciary's adoption of a nevv standard it is not obvious that the 
legislature has abrogated an otherwise constitutional!} protected cause of action See Lanev supra at % 42 ("the 
court recogmze[s] that the open courts clause does not give the court the power to create new legal rights") 
47
 DeBrvv Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 440 (Utah 1995) 
48
 See Addendum 1 to Motion to .Amend Opposition to Siirnmary Judgment, pp 5-7 The Plaintiffs' 
memorandum argues against summar} judgment based on Lanev and Article XVI § 5 The} correctly point out that 
the Berry test applies when a constitutionally protected cause of action is abrogated by legislative enactment. 
however, here, the court first must determme if a cause of action in negligence against a mumcipahty existed pnor 
to the 1987 amendment to the immunity act The Plaintiffs' memorandum assumes this pomt of the analysis but 
this court cannot do so 
49
 Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend pp 6-9 Pleasant Grove states that "operation and 
maintenance of a public park and baseball diamond" were "not proprietary m nature" and so were "go\ emmental 
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operation of a public park a "governmental function" or otherwise Thus, this court must proceed 
on its own review of the relevant law. 
Application of the Standiford Definition. In applying Standiford to governmental 
immunity cases, the scope of immunity determined by the legislature "must, of course, be 
accorded a presumption of constitutionality.'00 Also, there is an appropriate "degree of 
flexibility" in applying the Standiford definition.51 For example, the rigid argument that any 
function that "can be and sometimes is offered by private organizations" is non-governmental, 
has been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court.*2 Whether or not pnvate persons or entities may 
be able to perform the same function or offer the same sendee is "on!}' one factor to be 
considered in determining whether that function is a governmental function and therefore 
-immune,"*3 
In examining whether or not the operation of a city park is a "governmental function", the 
court has found no post-Standiford cases on point. However, there are historic cases which 
functions" even under Standiford. However, there is no citation to authority for this proposition. Id at 8 
50
 DeBrv, supra, at 440. 
51
 ! i 
52
 Lyon v. Burton. 2000 UT 19 % 40; 5 P.3d 616, 627-28 (analyzing fire fighting). 
Id. Also, "[t]he more an activity is revenue producing and especially profit making, the more likely this 
factor weighs in favor of its being nongovernmental" Id. at n 10. 
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address pubhc parks and similar facilities.5"1 Under the case law prior to both Standiford and the 
1987 amendment to the immunity act, operation of a municipal park has been held to be a 
governmental function. In Husband v. Salt Lake Citv (1937). the court affirmed a previous 
holding that "in the establishment, maintenance, and care of its parks, a city acts in its 
governmental capacity7 and is not liable for the negligence of its employees or agents in 
connection therewith."55 The court further held that "maintenance and care of the park" then at 
issue was a governmental function, and that cases holding to the contrary were "contrary to the 
weight of authority."56 In Ramirez v. Qgden Citv (1955). the court held that a public recreation 
facility that was a general benefit to the community without being a profit-making enterprise was 
immune from suit.5" 
Other cases are less clear. For example, in Griffin v. Salt Lake Citv (1947). the Utah 
Supreme Court held that factors indicating operation of a public swimming pool as a "business 
enterprise", such as "an admission charge [and] a collection of taxes on admission", made that 
' Interestingly, when the Utah Supreme Court needed to deterrrhne if a cause of action existed prior to 
1987. that court did not reply on post-Standiford cases, but instead looked to historical cases addressing the issue 
such as Lehi City v. Meiling 48 P.2d 530 (Utah 1935) and Egelhoffv. Qgden Citv. 267 P. 1011 (Utah 1928). 
55
 Husband, 69 P.2d 491, 494 (Utah 1937) (citing numerous cases including Sehv v. Salt Lake City, 41 
Utah 535. and Alder v. Salt Lake Citv, 64 Utah 568 (erecting a grandstand in a public park was a government 
function qualifying for irnmunity from suit)). 
56
 Husband, supra, at 494-95 & 461. 
~ Ramirez, supra, at 466. 
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activity a proprietary function.58 However, the court suggested that in the "case of a swimming 
pool operated without charge in connection with some park," immunity may have been 
retained."9 
Other jurisdictions had reached conflicting results at the time Standiford was adopted.60 
Thus, it appears that historically, maintenance and operation of a city park in Utah was at best a 
governmental function, at worst a mixed question. 
Absent controlling authority, this court cannot say that operation of a public park is a 
non-governmental function. Though in Standiford the court found that "operation of a public 
golf course" is not a governmental function,61 this does not fully answer the question as Plaintiffs 
have suggested. For example, is the construction of any public gathering place a governmental 
function? What about a public park with facilities dedicated to public debate and discussion9 
What about state or national parks? How important, if at all, is the particular purpose of such 
facilities? For example, should a public park with sports facilities be treated differently than one 
with only open fields? In his Lanev concurrence, Justice Russon highlights the difficulties in 
58
 Griffin 176 P.2d 156, 160 (Utah 1947). 
59
 Id. at 159-60 (the swimming pool "may be adjacent to a public park, but it is not operated as part of 
such adjacent park"; "[tjhis is not the case of a swimming pool operated without charge in connection with some 
park"; "[m]ost of the cases cited where the municipality was held to be immune . . . are . . . cases where no 
admission fee . . . is charged or the fees charged are . . . nominal.. . ."). 
60
 Standiford, supra at 1233-34. 
61
 Id. at 1237. 
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appl}dng the Siandiford test. He calls "-proprietary functions" those "normal!}' performed by 
private persons or businesses. M6: Here, the parties have not offered any argument as 10 what is 
"normally" done by private entities. 
The Utah caseiaw (or lack thereof) briefed and argued before this court provides no clear 
analysis or demarcation for the court to follow. In such a circumstance, the presumption of 
constitutionality afforded to legislative enactments and the "degree of flexibility'" which attends 
the Stantiford definition weigh against a finding that the immunity act is unconstitutional!}7 
overbroad. The above-cited limiting language of the Lanev decision further weighs against such 
a finding. 
Therefore, this court cannot find that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act as amended 
in 1987 unconstitutionally abrogated a pre-existing and constitutionally protected cause of action 
for negligence against a municipality or its employee in the operation or maintenance of a public 
park. Because there is no finding that the legislamre impermissibh' abrogated a cause of action, 
this court will not apply the Bern' test as directed by Lanev: the immunity statute must be 
applied as presently in effect. As discussed above, Pleasant Grove City is immune from suit 
under the statute. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, the motion of Defendant Pleasant Grove City for 
Laney, supra at % 76 (Justice Russon. concurring). 
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summary judgement under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (as in effect in 2002) is 
GRANTED. Pleasant Grove is ordered to submit an order in accordance with this decision and in 
compliance with U.R. C J?. 7(f). 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page 
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Division VTI: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter came before the court on various motions and a memorandum decision was 
issued on March 29, 2005 which, in part, granted Pleasant Grove's motion for summary 
judgment. On April 6, 2005, the Plaintiffs filed an objection the Pleasant Grove's proposed order 
on the March 29 decision. The court now issues this supplemental memorandum decision to 
augment the March 29 decision. 
Background 
In its decision of March 29, 2005, this court found that Pleasant Grove is immune from 
suit by the Plaintiffs under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act as in effect in 2002. Pleasant 
Grove had argued that the claim for negligence was barred by the Act's "natural condition" 
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m69 
exception1, and that a similar exception for "infliction of mental anguish"2 barred the Plaintiffs' 
claim for relief for emotional distress. The court found that the natural condition exception did 
apply and Pleasant Grove was immune from suit for negligence under that provision. 
Further, in other motions that the court construed as further briefing on Pleasant Grove's 
summary judgment motion, the Plaintiffs advanced constitutional arguments in opposition to 
Pleasant Grove's claim for immunity. These arguments questioned the constitutionality of the 
Act's definition of "governmental function."3 The court found that the controlling authority did 
not invalidate this definition as applied to the facts of this case and granted Pleasant Grove's 
motion for summary judgment. 
The Plaintiffs object to Pleasant Grove's proposed order on two bases: that the order 
dismisses the Plaintiffs' claim for emotional distress which was not addressed by the prior 
decision of the court; and, that the order dismisses the complaint with prejudice which is 
inappropriate in this case. Each basis will be discussed in turn. 
Emotional Distress 
The Plaintiffs emotional distress claims are barred by the Immunity Act. The 
determination whether a governmental entity is immune from suit entails a three-part analysis: 
1
 U.C.A. § 63-30-10(11) (as amended through 2002). 
2
 U.C.A. § 63-30-10(2) (as amended through 2002). 
3
 U.C.A. § 63-30-2(4)(a) (as amended through 2002). 
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(1) Is the activity a "governmental function'' covered by the general grant of immunity under § 
63-30-3? (2) If so, does the immunity act waive immunity as to the activity in question? (3) If 
liability has been waived, does the immunity act except the activity in question from the waiver 
of immunity?4 
The analysis of the first two questions is fully addressed by the prior decision of the 
court. See the Memorandum Decision in this case issued March 29, 2005, pp. 6-7. In short, 
Pleasant Grove's operation and maintenance of Manila Field is a governmental function within 
the meaning of the Act, and the Act specifically waives immunity from suit for the negligence of 
Pleasant Grove. 
The Act contains various exceptions to the waiver of immunity for negligence actions. 
For purposes of the Plaintiffs' claim of emotional distress, Pleasant Grove relies on U.CA. § 63-
30-10(2), which retains immunity from suit for "injury proximately caused by . . . negligen[ce] 
. , . if the injur>r arises out of, in connection with, or results from: . . . infliction of mental 
anguish . . . ,f° Thus, the statutory language specifically retains immunity for negligence-based 
claims for emotional distress. 
This plain-language reading of the statute is consistent with the view expressed by the 
4
 Lovendahl v. Jordan School District 2002 UT 130 115, 63 P.3d 705, 709 (Utah 2002) (citing Ledfors v. 
Emery County School District 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1993)). 
5
 U.CA. § 63-30-10 & -10(2) (as amended through 2002). 
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Utah Court of Appeals. In "ascertaining] whether . . . immunity has been expressly waived for 
. . . alleged . . . emotional distress" the Court of Appeals noted that "section 63-30-10 [contains] 
an explicit exception to the waiver provided for by that section for injuries arising out of 
'infliction of mental anguish. ",6 
The case cited by both the Plaintiffs and Pleasant Grove in briefing on the original 
motion, Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 2001 UT App. 277, 34 P.3d 234 (Utah App. 2001) is 
inapposite.7 In that case, the trial court granted summary judgment to Salt Lake City in a 
negligence case without issuing an explanatory- decision. The claims in that case included 
general negligence, as well as mental distress claims. The Court of Appeals reversed the grant of 
summary judgment because, though the Immunity Act does retain immunity from suit for claims 
related-to-mentaLanguish-under § 63-30-10(2), the Plaintiffs other negligence claims could not 
have been dismissed under that provision.8 Here, the Plaintiffs are correct in noting that they 
have "plead negligent infliction of emotional harm, [for] which [immunity] is waived because the 
emotional distress constitutes damages caused by a negligent act."9 However, § 63-30-10(2) 
6
 Ativa v. Salt Lke County. 852 P.2d 1007, 1011 & n.6 (Utah App. 1993). 
7
 All parties mis-cited this case. Pleasant Grove cited it as '7001 UT 277"; the Plaintiffs cited it as "2004 
UT App. 59", which is a later appeal on the case on issues unrelated to mental anguish. 
8
 Gabnel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2001 UT App 277 HI 11-12. 
Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendant Pleasant Grove's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
November 4, 2004, p. 19. 
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specifically excepts damages for "mental anguish" from the general waiver. Nothing in Gabriel 
suggests a contrary result. 
Therefore, under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, U.C A. § 63-30-1 et seq.9 as in 
effect in 2002, Pleasant Grove is immune from suit by the Plaintiffs' for their claims for 
emotional distress. 
The Plaintiffs' later constitutional arguments do not address mental distress or anguish. 
The substance of the Plaintiffs "Supplemental Memorandum re: the Constitutionality of § 63-
30-2(4)(a) after Lanev v. Fairview City" deals solely with the Plaintiffs' wrongful death claim 
which has been fully treated by this court's March 29, 2005 decision. 
Dismissal with Prejudice 
Consistent with this-court's present and prior decisions, Pleasant Grove is wholly immune 
from suit under the causes of action alleged by the Plaintiffs. Therefore, it is appropriate that the 
dismissal be with prejudice on these claims. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, Pleasant Grove's motion for summary judgement as to the 
Plaintiffs claims for emotional distress is GRANTED. All claims adjudicated in favor of Pleasant 
Grove by this decision and the court's decision of March 29, 2005, shall be dismissed with 
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prejudice. The order submitted by counsel for Pleasant Grove comphes with this court's 
decisions in all material respects and will be executed by this court forthwith. 
Dated this D day of t ^ A c ^ . , 20£5r 
JUi dge .James R. Ta||&j 
Fourth Judicial Drs' 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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Grappendorfv. City of Pleasant Grove, Supplemental Memorandum Decision 
Copies of this Decision mailed to: 
Phillip S. Ferguson 
50 S. Main, Ste. 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Gary R. Guelker, Peter Stirba 
215 S. State St. Ste. 1150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Edward P. Moriarty, Jeffrey D. Gooch, Shandor S. Badaruddin 
9 Exchange PL, Ste. 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Paul D. Veasy, Sharrieff Shah 
201 S. Main St., Ste. 1800 
PO Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Mailed this / / day of 7 / 4 ^ - ^ , 2005, postage pre-paid as noted above 
.>sJ 
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Tab 11 
PETER STIRBA (Bar No. 3118) 
GARY R. GUELKER (Bar No. 8474) 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
215 South State, Suite 1150 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -0810 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pleasant Grove 
IN THE COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL GRAPPENDORF and HEIDI ORDER GRANTING CITY OF 
GRAPPENDORF, individually and as PLEASANT GROVE'S MOTION FOR 
parents and heirs of DANIEL AUSTIN SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
GRAPPENDORF (deceased), PHIL : 
THOMPSON and JENNY THOMPSON, 
Plaintiffs, Civil No: 030404102 
: Judge James R. Taylor 
v. 
CITY OF PLEASANT GROVE and 
AMERICAN SPORTS 
INTERNATIONAL, LTD. a/k/a 
AMERICAN ATHLETICS, INC., an Iowa : 
Corporation, BECWILL CORP., d/b/a 
PROPER PITCH, a North Carolina : 
Corporation, PROPER PITCH, and Does 
I-X. : 
Defendants. : 
This matter came on for hearing on February 28, 2005, pursuant to (1) Pleasant 
Grove City's Motion for Summary Judgment, (2) Plaintiffs' Motion for Continuance of Pleasant 
Grove's Summary Judgment Motion, (3) Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Their Response in 
FILED 
FonrvK .;:HMf:>a! District Court 
oi v »•;£:•; Gountv, State of Utah 
Deputy 
Opposition to Defendant Pleasant Grove's Motion for Summary Judgment, and (4) Pleasant 
Grove City's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Their Response in Opposition to 
Defendant Pleasant Grove City's Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs were represented by 
their attorney, Ryan M. Springer. Defendant Pleasant Grove City was represented by its attorney, 
Peter Stirba. The Court, having read the parties' memoranda, factual submissions, case law 
presented in support and opposition to the Motions, and having heard the arguments of counsel, 
and for the reasons stated in its March 29, 2005 Memorandum Decision, hereby ORDERS as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Continuance of Pleasant Grove's Summary Judgment 
Motion is MOOT because there is no need for additional discovery for the summary judgment 
motion; 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Their Response in Opposition to Defendant Pleasant 
Grove's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; 
3. Pleasant Grove City's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Their 
Response in Opposition to Defendant Pleasant Grove City's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
DENIED; 
4. Pleasant Grove City's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and 
plaintiffs' claims against this defendant are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. 
-2-
DATED this / / d a y of A^riraOS. 
v#* 
,B¥raiTdpi 
The Hoij6rable J2 
Fourth Judicial. 
jfewjfl 
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